Bubbles, Valuations, and Speculation

The blogosphere has been running ragged over recent comments from Tsur Somerville regarding whether or not Vancouver is in a "bubble".

“'You can’t burst a bubble that wasn’t there,' said Somerville. 'But you can have prices above where they should be and it not be a ­bubble.'

'A bubble isn’t just defined by high prices,' he said.

Somerville identified a housing 'bubble' as conditions akin to what was happening in 2007. 

'It didn’t matter what the condo looked like or what it’s going to look like or who was building it, people were lined up around the block and snapping it up,' he said. 'They were saying, "I’ll take 12, please." That’s more of a bubble environment.'"

This piqued my interest because I don't think Somerville would state this without having some arguable justification for it, then I remembered a post on the subject written in 2005 from Calculated Risk. According to him, when we’re talking about "bubbles" we should be talking about speculation and over-valuation, and I think this recent post from him, and the one linked that he wrote in 2005, are must-reads. In the 2005 post he states:

"A bubble requires both overvaluation based on fundamentals and speculation. It is natural to focus on an asset’s fundamental value, but the real key for detecting a bubble is speculation – the topic of this post. Speculation tends to chase appreciating assets, and then speculation begets more speculation, until finally, for some reason that will become obvious to all in hindsight, the 'bubble' bursts. Speculation is key"

There is little doubt for me that Vancouver's fundamentals are out of whack. By my measure price-rent ratios are at least 70% higher than their long-term average.

What Tsur Somerville is stating is that “speculation” is not occurring so there is no “bubble”. What I think may be amiss in this reasoning is considering the possibility that "speculation" did occur but hasn't yet unwound. Instead the speculative excesses witnessed last decade in the means described by Somerville were held in stasis for 4 years with cratering real rates and opening the barn door to 100% mortgage loan underwriting during the aftermath of the 2008 recession. The speculative excesses Somerville is pointing to as absent could still be with us, the participants given a stay. Even that aside, speculation occurs in other ways besides the abject cases of flippers. As Calculated Risk noted:

"This type of speculation appears to be rampant only in certain regions, mostly the coastal areas. However, something akin to speculation is more widespread – homeowners using substantial leverage with escalating financing such as ARMs or interest only loans."

In the more recent article he concludes:

"...the real causes of the bubble were rapid changes in the mortgage lending industry combined with a lack of regulatory oversight. The speculators just added to the fire."

“Rapid changes in the mortgage lending industry” occurred in Canada in the form of falling interest rates through the 2000s and kicking out borrowing terms to 0-40 (zero down payment and 40 year amortization schedule), then slowly relinquishing them to the current 30 year amortization for uninsured and 5-25 for insured. The underwriting of loans via a 100% government backstop certainly helped to lower spreads. I have graphed the effect here by looking at a normalized maximum loan amount using average 5-year mortgage rates, assuming a fixed income and fixed debt-service ratio.

An insured or uninsured borrower could withdraw 60% more in income-flat terms than he/she could in 2000 at the peak in the three years after the 2008 recession. In current conditions there is a marked gap between those who are applying for insured and uninsured loans. An uninsured loan, all else equal, still commands 60% more loan than 12 years ago, an insured loan by contrast is now about 30% more.

The “lack of regulatory oversight” was true in the US and I don’t see the same severity in Canada. That stated, recent moves in Canada by OSFI indicate oversight is now being bolstered and they’re not finished. Despite Canada’s “sound” banking oversight, banks are looking like my dog after I come home and there’s garbage on the kitchen floor. Dogs do what dogs do, and I don’t blame her for being a dog.

A trip down to the epicentres of the US housing bubbles and reading of the lending practices allowed to occur over the last decade there indicate to me Canada is not in the same situation as the US but that is not to say Canada gets a free pass. Tracking lending malfeasance is difficult in part because it is necessarily obfuscated not only by borrowers for various reasons, but also by some lenders who understand they are obtaining free lunches at the expense of direct systematic risks borne mostly by the populace and the government. That should count for something.

Likewise the attitudes I hear in Vancouver regarding housing are markedly different from conversations I have with Americans six years after the US housing bubble peaked. That difference in attitude is interesting and perhaps cautionary as to how much outstanding "speculation" Vancouver still carries.

CMHC Tightening

I have been calling for further loan tightening being ordained by the federal government. CBC seems to be able to easily quote Mr. Flaherty while he's on tour:

Finance Minister Jim Flaherty said he shares the concern of Canada's top banking regulator that lenders are loosening their mortgage standards too much, but said any problems in the system are being corrected...
"OSFI's concern arises out of some work that OSFI has done as part of the ordinary course of its business to look at some of the loans being made by financial institutions," he said. "I was informed of what their assessment showed with respect to a few financial institutions, which is a matter of concern."
"That is being corrected," Flaherty said.

As I have mentioned in the past, further tightening amounting to reduced access to loans or faster amortizations seemed to be a shoo-in, now we are getting hints that the government is very concerned about debt levels and systematic financial risks, and will ensure they do not become worse than they already are.

This is akin to the previous explicit announcements on CMHC mortgage insurance qualifications announced in previous years. This year, it appears, guidance from OSFI and implementation of Basel 3 accounting practices -- not to mention higher prices -- are going to act as a brake on housing activity in 2012.

Elections and the Unspoken Fear

I have been following local Vancouver City election campaigning of late. I have been particularly interested in looking at the various platforms aimed at combating housing "affordability" and "speculation" in Vancouver. Various parties and candidates offer potential solutions to solving "affordability" and "speculation", ranging from "cutting red tape", adding low-to-medium-income rental housing, changing the housing mix, embedding neighbourhoods in the planning process, to outright curbs on foreign ownership.

I think, though, there is a lack of debate surrounding high prices in general. Most candidates seem to understand that prices are high but few seem convinced, at least publicly, that prices are destined to drop. All debate seems to surround the possibility that high prices are here to stay as Vancouver "graduates" into the ranks of a world city with commensurate high prices. This may simply be that telling homeowners prices -- and their homeowner equity -- are destined to fall is unpopular it wouldn't garner popular support, but after listening to the candidates speak, Tweet, and comment, I come away with the impression that crashing prices experienced by our urban Cascadian neighbours to the south are almost entirely foreign.

Nonetheless the assumption of high prices leaves me feeling raw, first that prices are obviously in a speculative bubble as measured by price-income and price-rent ratios. The evidence supporting prices remaining high is suspect, it relies on a continuous flow of foreign capital and continuously low interest rates. Most purchases of property in the Greater Vancouver area (though perhaps not certain sub-areas) are by locals with locally-derived incomes. By that measure it's a relatively simple exercise to calculate how much foreign investment would be required to keep prices from dropping, and it amounts to something approaching British Columbia's annual GDP.

Given that house prices are on an earnings basis a poor return on investment, we should be asking first whether these poor earnings are in the long-term best interests of Vancouver's economic growth. Second, if we determine that expensive house (actually, land) prices are a net harm to economic output, we should be asking a big question: is it possible and desirable to suppress land prices to enable more stable and diverse economic growth?

Keeping land prices low is not an unheard of concept. Through various schemes surrounding limiting leverage, land use plans, landlord and tenant protection legislation, and taxation various jurisdictions have been more (though arguably not wholly) successful at reducing land speculation. Parts of Texas and Germany have done this.

No easy answers -- and no doubt simplistic suggestions the blogosphere seems to be prone to peddling are riddled with flaws -- nonetheless I dismiss chronic boom-bust cycles that have plagued Vancouver are not controllable using thoughtful and long-term feedback mechanisms.

Bill C-3 Gets Royal Assent

Bill C-3, the one I discussed here, received royal assent on June 26th. This bill includes changing and formalizing how mortgage insurance operates in Canada. Many of the provisions in the bill are not new but were administered through informal agreements now made formal through legislation, though there is much detail that is under the authority and at the whim of the government of the day. Most notably:

• The Ministry of Finance can impose additional capital reserve ratios on CMHC and private mortgage insurers
• The Ministry of Finance can effectively revoke the ability of certain lenders from applying for government-backed mortgage insurance.
• CMHC and mortgage insurers must pay fees in accordance with elevated risk levels it incurs
• CMHC must open its books to the Ministry of Finance
• CMHC's books will be available through FOI if not publicly displayed
• There is a 10% deductible to any funds that are paid by the government to backstop private mortgage insurers. CMHC is 0%

If you have time there are some interesting testimonies from the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance sitting on June 20, 2011. Among parties present were Finn Poschmann (CD Howe), Jane Londerville (U Guelph), and Karen Kinsley (CMHC). I highlight a few excerpts for the record, emphasis mine:

Poschmann: Private mortgage insurers, which operate, as I said, in roughly one-third of the residential mortgage insurance market that CMHC does not occupy, have their liabilities guaranteed by the Government of Canada, less a 10% deductible. We could call that a 90% guarantee. This makes it possible for the private insurers to compete in the residential mortgage insurance business with CMHC.

CMHC is a crown corporation, the liabilities of which are backed 100% by the full faith credit of the Government of Canada and therefore the federal taxpayer. This means that CMHC's cost of capital is less than it is for the private insurers. In order words, it costs the private insurers more to go to the market to raise money to underwrite the insurance premiums that they, in turn, write. It costs more because they do not have the Government of Canada's backing. But as I indicated, the system works well enough that the existing private insurers tend to hold about 30% of the market. The system more or less works, however imperfectly it may do so.

Dr. Londerville: the CMHC, as a crown corporation, has its mortgage insurance policies implicitly 100% guaranteed by the federal government under the Basel accord. CMHC-insured mortgages, then, require no capital reserves by financial institutions. Clauses 22 and 24 in this act retain the corresponding maximum protection for private companies at only 90%. At the moment, the lender decides who will insure a mortgage loan: CMHC or a private insurer.

As a consequence, banks whose loans are insured through a private firm must set aside some capital reserves against the possibility of default by the insurer, which is not a requirement if the loan is insured by CMHC. Thus, rates of return are higher on CMHC-backed mortgages.

When profit margins are thin and banks are nervous about capital reserves, as in the financial crisis that began in 2008, this makes a major difference. The evidence of this is in the growth of CMHC's mortgage insurance premium income during 2008 and the drop in Genworth's.

Because of the difference in levels of guarantee, each financial institution's treasury or risk officer determines how much of the institution's mortgage insurance business can be sent to private investors, limiting the amount because of the capital reserve requirements. The implication of this for consumers is reduced choice. This is not a competitive marketplace with consumers freely choosing which company will insure their loan, even though they are the ones who pay the large upfront fee for this insurance.

CMHC's stated plan for 2010 was to have $520 billion in insurance outstanding, which represents approximately 70% of the market. Genworth has been competing in this market since 1995 and holds most of the remaining 30%. To me, one party with such a dominant share of the market implies inadequate competition. There are now two relatively new competitors in the market to battle for the private company share of insurance. To make this a truly competitive market, changes to the 90% guarantee are necessary, either by reducing CMHC's guarantee or by raising the one for the private sector.

Poschmann: The key point, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Adler, is clarity from the point of view of parliamentary oversight and oversight by the public of the risks to which Canadians are exposed through CMHC's mortgage underwriting and mortgage insurance activities and securitization activities. Again, we have little reason to doubt that the risks inherent in these activities are well managed. However, they are very large numbers, and they're very large risks. If you think about the impact of a significant housing market shock, while CMHC is well capitalized, as Ms. Kinsley has indicated--capitalized, they say, at higher than the standards that OSFI requires, so we should be well protected as taxpayers--nonetheless a significant market shock could easily eat up the capital that CMHC has set aside.

Kinsley: The issue of the differential in our mandate and the cost of that really gets to the nub of the difference in the guarantee between CMHC and the private insurers. We are, by virtue of being a crown corporation, 100% guaranteed by the Government of Canada. Recognizing that private insurers can select the markets they choose to be in, and obviously they will not serve those that are less profitable, the government has set the guarantee for private insurers at 90%. That 10% differential in the guarantee, in order to create a level playing field between us, compensates us for that difference.

We have been able to operate successfully on that basis, as is evident by our annual returns, and the over $12 billion that we've been able to return to the government.

I see the key points from this testimony as:

• CMHC enjoys a reduced cost of capital. Londerville argued convincingly that this produces an unfair advantage for CMHC compared to private insurers who will either accept higher risks with lower premiums or give up market share. That CMHC commands 70% of the market means they set the price.
• Banks are transferring significant risk provisions onto CMHC via the 100% guarantee. This means they do not need to provision for counterparty risk on their balance sheets. As was mentioned this was somewhat helpful in 2008 when banks were scared of counterparty risk. The 100% guarantee does not show up on the balance sheets of those making the loans.
• CMHC is well capitalized and can withstand a moderate housing recession without touching government coffers. A severe recession would likely wipe them clean, and they would be asking for some of the expropriated monies back, though it's a bit funny that a corporation would be asking its shareholders for dividend clawbacks. (Imagine if RBC asked shareholders for its dividends back!)
• Kinsley opines that the 100% guarantee is necessary to compensate CMHC for providing mortgage insurance when private insurers are unable or unwilling to provide insurance in certain market segments. The problem here is that there is no condition by which an outsider can determine which markets are "distressed" enough that private insurers refuse to step up, and one major reason why CMHC commands the market share it does.

I would recommend to policymakers that CMHC's function of providing access to housing (and not necessarily mortgage insurance) in times when the private market is dysfunctional is noble but there must be limits. When its mandate starts encroaching on mainstream market functions, by underwriting 70% of a market that by all accounts is functioning as it should -- private insurers (well, insurer) are competing -- it risks usurping its mandate. In the extreme, as is potentially the case now, when house prices are high, CMHC can only fulfill its affordability mandate by taking on more risk, when it should be focused on lowering, not enabling high, prices.

The other elephant in the room is that Canada has not yet experienced a moderate or severe housing recession in 20 years, and certainly not when interest rates are so low. While we can opine that CMHC is well-capitalized and that, perhaps, making mortgage insurance fully private may help against future asset price bubbles, we do not have an example that can be reasonably used as a passable stress test. Australia was cited as a country that privatized its mortgage insurance business about 15 years ago, but Australia has not experienced a severe housing recession under this regime to validate private insurers' capital adequacy requirements. In other words, thinking that insuring against correlated risks can be privatized should be thoroughly vetted against potential housing market shocks in hundreds of years of world history. In my view, the best way to prevent governments from bailing out insurers is attempting to avoid the risk entirely, and that means using lower prices and higher yields as a fundamental gauge to set housing policy.

With Bill C-3 now emerging from the legislative sausage-maker its implementation will hopefully pave the way for recasting CMHC's important but dangerous role in Canada's housing market.

When Atlas Shrugs

It is rare that I listen more closely to people more than I do to central bankers and their entourage of economists, one because their words are clouded in nuance, two because their words are few and strategically meted. It so happens that Mark Carney will be giving a speech to the Vancouver Board of Trade tomorrow (Wednesday June 15 2011), apparently on Canada's housing market. Coincidence Carney is speaking in Vancouver about the housing market? You decide!

Carney's speeches are important because they have provided substantive hints at future directions of government policy, not only overnight lending rates on which his bank has direct influence but also on auxiliary government policies that affect economic growth in the medium term. One such area of concern recently highlighted by Carney has been the over-valuation of assets and elevated debt levels propagated by low interest rates, speculative bubbles, and international capital flows in Canada's housing market.

I will be eagerly awaiting the speech as I see it as providing key clues surrounding policy options for the federal, provincial, and municipal governments to quench speculative excesses in the housing market, at a time when interest rates are unusually accommodative. The speech is concurrent with ongoing OSFI investigations into banks' exposure to potential asset price bubbles (of which I touched on here). While this is a housing analysis blog and undoubtedly biased towards all things "housing", it should be made eminently clear that, in my view, an unstable housing bubble is the key risk in Canada's economic growth in the medium term and in the interests of all Canadians to ensure such a bubble is mitigated as efficiently and quickly as possible.

I will provide my thoughts on Carney's speech after it is distributed.

edit: it is rare that the Bank of Canada and Department of Finance diverge from bringing a common message. Here is the latest press release from the Department of Finance:

Among the important measures included in the Act are those to: ...

Reinforce the stability of Canada’s housing finance system

• Strengthening the Government’s oversight of the mortgage insurance industry.

If it were me I would regiment that all low ratio loans be qualified at the 5 year posted rate, and that mortgage insurance be capped in markets where prices have deviated from incomes. My concern is that, like certain Asian economies, over-indebtedness is not necessarily limited to high-ratio loans, and current low-ratio loans may end up being tomorrow's high-ratio loans. Strengthening oversight may have to be extended beyond CMHC. We shall see!

Vancouver is affordable

...as long as you ignore the parts that are unaffordable, at least according to condo marketeer and dark-rimmed rose-coloured-glasses-wearing Bob Rennie (emphasis mine):

Mr. Rennie, who commissions research on real-estate trends for an annual talk to the industry, said that once the skewed prices paid by a small group of mostly mainland Chinese buyers in Richmond and the west side of Vancouver are removed, housing prices are comparatively reasonable.

As well, the numbers indicate that only about 1 per cent of those high-end buyers are non-resident investors.

“When you’re looking at the numbers, you have to build a fence around the west side, where there are external forces operating that have nothing to do with local forces,” Mr. Rennie said.

Yes, he said, the sale prices on those houses have increased dramatically in the past year.

But that top one-fifth of the market operates in its own world and has almost nothing to do with what is happening with real estate in the rest of the region that is connected to the local-buyer market, he said.

Well no. Indeed if we do take out the top-tiered sales from Vancouver's real estate market, the rest of the region is not-so-hot, though still hot. Contrary to the supposed fenced-offedness of certain "prime" areas of the city, what's hot in Vancouver West et al must be leaking into other areas because, well, rich residents (and 1% non-residents...) pricing out the rest of the locals tends to make locals look elsewhere for accommodations because -- go figure -- locals want to live locally. And the "top one fifth" is 20% of, or 1 in 5, purchases. Yeah...

Now why oh why would Mr. Rennie be speaking about foreign ownership and affordability now? Did someone ask him for his opinion? The fellow doth protest too much, methinks. Look for more explicit calls for foreign ownership restrictions or other similar curbs in the coming months.

Something's Happening Here

Last week was the 25th anniversary of Expo 86, the world's fair held in Vancouver in 1986, lasting from May until October. From a housing perspective 1986 is important because it corresponds to the lowest point of real prices since the mid-70s. Since then, for the past 25 years, prices have been rising and average detached houses now stand at close to ten times the nominal price of those heady days of 1986. (Graph courtesy yattermatters)

So just for fun, how many people were around before 1986 who still live in Vancouver? It's an interesting question -- how many people are old enough to remember the carnage of the second-largest bubble in Vancouver's history that occurred in the early 1980s? (Graph courtesy UBC Sauder School of Business.)

So running a few numbers we arrive at the following:

• There were 3 million people in BC in 1986.
• 676,000 people died in BC since 1986.
• Approximately 1 million people out-migrated from BC since 1986.
• The population of BC now stands at around 4.5 million

We assume that most of the people dying in BC were living in BC in the early '80s, say 80%. We then assume that 50% of the 1 million out-migrants have since returned to, and are currently residing in, BC (and were residents before 1986). From these estimates of the 3 million people who resided in the province in 1986, only about 2 million remain in the province. Therefore, only about 43% of BC's population would have any chance of experiencing the fallout of house prices in the early '80s. Practically it is even less, since many counted in that population weren't old enough to be interested in housing prices in the early '80s anyway.

Given that most people residing in BC would not have remembered Vancouver in 1986, with its bargain-basement housing prices still shivering from the sell-off earlier in the decade, it should not be surprising in the least that the majority of people view BC's, and particularly Vancouver's, real estate as a can't-lose bet. We haven't even begun to include people who rode the early '80s bust but think this time is different.

I have high confidence that most of readers here will not remember Expo 86, not least the younger demographic of people likely to be reading this post. But in the off chance you do remember Expo Ernie, monorails, and what the heck that other platform at Stadium Skytrain Station is for, here's some nostalgia, from simpler times when a house was simply a place to live:

Comparing US Prices at peak to Canada Today

It's always refreshing to see new data to analyse but it's equally as refreshing to see existing data analysed in a different way. Over at vancouvercondo.info poster vibe performed some analysis comparing the price-income ratios in Canada today to the US in 2006, around the peak of their prices [jesse: I inserted an updated graph]:

"...there was some discussion about whether Canada is in a real estate bubble. Everyone pretty much agrees about Vancouver, but here are a couple of points that were made about the national scene:

1. It is reasonable to claim that there is not a housing bubble in Canada because only certain areas are over inflated.
2. Vancouver's very high prices skew the national average and cause Canada to look worse than it really is.

One thing I think we can all agree on is that the US did have a housing bubble. Well I put together a spreadsheet that I feel shows that affordability is about as bad across Canada as it was in the US at their peak. It also shows that Vancouver is not skewing our national data any more than the most overpriced cities in the US were skewing their data. In order to measure affordability I used house price to personal income ratios. I compared the 20 cities used in the Case Shiller Housing Index to the 6 cities used in the Teranet Housing Index. The US data is from 2006 while the Canadian data is from 2009.

I think the following graph most clearly illustrates my point:

Vancouver is the only Canadian city with a ratio over 9, while the US had 3: LA, San Fran and San Diego. Toronto is the only Canadian city with a ratio between 5 and 9, the US had 9 in this range. The under 5 range looks bigger for Canada but we have more population covered by our index than they do by theirs. The important thing is that the percentage of each nations population living in cities with elevated ratios is similar.

The distribution and average ratios for both countries are almost identical.

(Highlighting above is mine.)

Almost identical.

These data would be less of a concern if sales volume were low but, based on the volume of sales in the past several years, we know a not-insignificant portion of the population have bought at high prices. In addition we know the make-up of personal debt in Canada has been trending into the "unsustainable" territory, throwing into serious question the argument that future income gains justify high prices, even in part.

Gird yer loins!

You are here--updated

I have seen a few requests for an update to the 'you are here' graph. Well, here it is. Data are from Royal Lepage here.

Here are all the caveats. All prices are adjusted for inflation, using Q1 2010 prices. The graph looks pretty much the same with a log scale or if you put the y-axis to zero. This is for Vancouver West condos--not because they are representative of the broader market but because this is ground zero for the bubble.


How far down to you expect this to go? How long? Why?

Canada's brewing debt storm - - Globe and Mail

For every $1 of disposable income, Canadians owe a record $1.47. How did it come to this?

By Paul Waldie and Steve Ladurantaye

From Saturday's Globe and Mail

Canadian borrowers are fast approaching a day of reckoning.

Lured by cheap money to buy up, buy in, expand and make over, families have pushed credit levels to a record high.

Now, mortgage rates are beginning to creep up and the Bank of Canada is poised to retreat from the record-low interest rates it adopted to fight the recession and spur recovery.

The end of the free-money era has left consumers more vulnerable than ever, and those who threw caution to the wind could soon face costs they can't handle.

Household debt has surged three time faster than income in recent years and now stands at a record high of more than $1-trillion. Put another way, Canadians owe about $1.47 for every dollar of disposable income. Even more remarkably, they took on more debt during the slump - a first for a recession - because borrowing was so cheap.

With debt levels this high, even a small hike in interest rates will be ugly for those whose incomes aren't rising fast enough to meet their day-to-day expenses.Their woes could have a snowball effect: As debt-strapped consumers pull back, their credit woes spill over into the broader economy and risk putting a damper on the recovery.

For some, the trouble has already begun. John Silver, who runs Community Financial Counselling Services in Winnipeg, has seen his caseload increase 20 per cent from last year. "We re seeing more people coming in with more stress with regard to their debt," he said.

Much of the recent rise in debt in Canada has been due to low interest rates, generally easier credit terms and fierce competition among lenders. Even when the recession hit in late 2008, Canadians remained far more confident than Americans in part because of a better housing market and stronger financial institutions. Consumer confidence in Canada is only about 20 per cent below where it was in 2007 whereas it's 60 per cent lower in the U.S.

The higher confidence level and stronger banks meant Canadians were far more eager to borrow during the recession than Americans, said Benjamin Tal, senior economist at CIBC World Markets."I can offer you a very low mortgage in the United States and you won't take it," he said. "In Canada you jump on it, because confidence is high."

Now though, "what I'm seeing is a consumer that is more sensitive to higher interest rates," he added.

Most of the increased debt, roughly 70 per cent, has been in mortgages, reflecting the still hot housing market in much of the country. That has left many households struggling to meet monthly payments on hefty mortgages and more susceptible to rising rates. Families in Vancouver, for example, spend about 68 per cent of their disposable income on the cost of maintaining their house, compared to less than 40 per cent 10 years ago.

"There's been a real frenzy just to get in [to a house] at all cost, because if you don't get in you may never get in," said Scott Hanah chief executive of the Credit Counselling Society, a non-profit group based in Vancouver that helps people sort out their debts.His organization is fielding about 4,000 calls a month and has seen a 10-per-cent increase this year in the number of people seeking help."Last year we saw an increase in activity of over 50 per cent. So to have a further 10 per cent increase on top of that is significant," he added.

There are many people in the same position as James Laidlaw and his young family, who borrowed to build onto their Toronto home, adding construction costs on to a mortgage to help finance $250,000 in renovations and an expansion of 600 square feet.

Even a jump in mortgage rates of just half a percentage point will mean an extra $1,700 a year for Mr. Laidlaw, his wife and two children."Every dollar counts and I'm already thinking about the other things that may suffer," he said. "Maybe we'll have to lose the vacation, or scale back Christmas.

"Canadians used to be big savers and cautious borrowers. In 1982, Canadians socked away 20 per cent of their disposable income and per capita debt stood at about $5,500, according to Statistics Canada. By contrast, Americans were saving just 7.5 per cent of their disposable income at that time and borrowed $6,500 per capita.

Savings and borrowing soon went in opposite directions in both countries and by 2002 debt levels surpassed disposable income for the first time. In 2005, the savings rate in Canada fell to 1.2 per cent, about the same as in the U.S. Meanwhile, per capital borrowing jumped to $28,390 in Canada and $48,700 in the U.S.Consumers are feeling the pinch. A survey last year by the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada showed 21 per cent of respondents could barely meet the interest payments on their loans. The group is about to release a similar survey this year and, said the group's chief executive Anthony Ariganello, the level of those struggling to cope has climbed to about 23 per cent.

"We may be back into a recession [next year] because, remember, part of what has helped us get out of this recession was spending and consumer spending at that, and if people don't have money to spend we could be rapidly back in to where we started," he added.And while consumer spending and confidence have increased recently, both may be short lived, said CIBC's Mr. Tal.

"There is a gap between confidence and ability," he said. "It's a gap between what's in your head and what's in your pocket. And this gap is, of course, a matter of concern because consumer confidence is high due to the fact that interest rates have been extremely low and people are able to finance those mortgages and those loans.

"In a recent report, Mr. Tal concluded that "Canadian consumer fundamentals are weaker than they have been in almost 15 years."That's something that concerns officials at the Bank of Canada. If consumers run into trouble with their mortgage payments, that in turn can lead to "wider problems with other consumer loans, such as credit card debt," David Wolf, a Bank of Canada economist, said in a speech in January. "Consumers may also have to curtail other spending to cope with their debt burdens, creating adverse spillovers to the real economy.

"Michael Hammond has already scaled back his plans. The Ottawa resident has a pre-approved mortgage of $220,000 and has been looking for a house. He nearly bought a $214,000 townhouse last week, but backed off because he's still considering the effect of eventual higher rates."I am mulling over mortgage scenarios in my head like crazy right now," he says. "It's a scary time to be looking for a house. I'm looking at three cheaper homes today because I am so worried about overextending myself and getting caught five years from now.

"Neil Bigelow and his partner Tina Boudreau are also running over financial calculations as they prepare to buy their first home. The couple has been planning to buy a piece of land in Halifax and build their own home. But the prospect of rising rates has them worried about how much to borrow.

"Right now I could probably get $200,000 mortgage," said Mr. Bigelow. "But what's going to happen down the road because interest rates are not going to stay where they are at."

By the numbers

68%: Average amount of disposable income households in Vancouver spend on the cost of a home

44%: Average in Toronto

35%: Average in Calgary

36%: Average in Montreal

30%: Average in Ottawa

21%: Percentage of Canadians who say they can't manage their debt load

147%: Debt-to-income ratio in Canada, a record high

157%: Debt-to-income ratio in the United States

70%: Percentage of debt held in mortgages in Canada

Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, CIBC Economics, National Bank economics and Statistics Canada

Danielle Park on Canadian Housing

Danielle Park gives an interview on howestreet.com on the Canadian housing market.

You can listen to the 16 minute interview here.

Housing Bubble - - Yes or No

Canadian Housing Bubble by Alexandre Pestov at York University's Schulich School of Business.

Here is the abstract, click on the above link for the full meal deal.

The cause of the housing bubble associated with the sharp run-up and the subsequent drop in home prices in the US over the period of 1999-2008 has been the focus of significant research attention. Despite numerous similarities, the Canadian housing market escapes the same level of interest, mostly due to the seemingly stable housing prices.

This paper explores the subject of a possible housing bubble in Canada. It examines a diverse array of factors that may have contributed to the rise in house prices in Canada. The paper evaluates each factor individually and determines the health of the Canadian housing market using common valuation techniques.

Results suggest that economic fundamentals in Canada provide little explanation for the Canadian house price dynamics. Market fundamentals have become insignificant in affecting house prices, and the price-momentum conditions characteristic of a bubble now exist. The extreme decoupling of the market prices from the underlying fundamentals suggests an upcoming correction in housing prices in Canada.

Rosenberg: Is the Canadian Housing Market in a Bubble?

In today’s Breakfast with Dave, Rosie discusses the Canadian housing market:

It sure looks that way. At a time when personal income is down around 1% in the last year, we have seen nationwide average home prices soar 21% and last month hit a record high, as did sales. In real terms, home price appreciation is back to where it was in 1989. Of course, back then, interest rates were far higher but then again, the economy was in the late stages of a phenomenal multi-year economic expansion, not making a transition from deep recession to nascent recovery.

While the Canadian economy is recovering, overall growth is still barely above zero as manufacturers grappled with excess inventories, a strong currency and a soft domestic demand picture south of the border. Employment conditions have improved, but are hardly that healthy, as we saw in the November jobs report where wages and the workweek were both down despite a constructive headline number (half of which were in the education sector, an inherently difficult area for statisticians to adequately seasonally adjust).

In answer to the question as to whether prices are in a bubble, all we will say is that when we ran some models showing Canadian home prices normalized by personal income or by residential rent, what we found is that housing values are anywhere between 15-35% above levels we would label as being consistent with the fundamentals. If being 15% to 35% overvalued isn’t a bubble, then it’s the next closest thing. We are talking about 2-3 standard deviation events here in terms of the parabolic move in Canadian home prices from their lows. So if it walks like a duck …

Source: Breakfast with Dave, Gluskin Sheff, December 10, 2009

Special Report - Canadian Housing Market, Dec 2009

Yes Virginia, There is a Housing Bubble

Condo lineups return

Yes Virginia, There is a Housing Bubble

Total madness. People lining up to buy a small box in the sky on a busy street next to a polluted waterway. Awesome!! Sign me up!

Reminder - the interest only payments on $500,000 are $1350 / month at today's 3.25% or nearly $2,200 / month at 5.25%.

TD Economics - Real Estate Trends Could Impact Future Path Of Canadian Monetary Policy

I suggest you read this TD Economics report released today. It contains some interesting thoughts about monetary policy and the real estate market across Canada.

Great Interview

I think this is a must read interview.

http://www.itulip.com/forums/showthread.php?p=123526#post123526

The Argument Against Value Analysis in Vancouver

Much has been made by me and other long-time commenters on this blog about what housing prices would be in the absence of a bubble, the market's so-called fundamental value. Yet Vancouver's housing market has rarely (not never) been at a "fundamental" valuation in the past generation. Does value investing have a place in Vancouver real estate if prices rarely agree with the theory? I will outline the case for why not and offer some commentary.

Here I have attempted to paraphrase many of this blog's comments into this post. The information is not new, only presented. I do hope that readers, if they have time, read some of the comments here and in the archives for more insights into the fascinating subject of real estate in Vancouver, the "most bubbly city in the world".

The simple way of determining fundamental value is to look at an asset's current and expected future cash flows, discount them at your cost of capital, and sum them up. mohican uses a simple formula that I crudely derived here. There are other simpler and more complex methods of course and there is always disagreement over assumptions. With Vancouver specifically the last time properties were valued at what I consider to be fundamental valuation was around 2000 and before that in the mid '80s. Others will say 2000 was never at fundamental valuation, a local minimum that never quite reached the trigger point for them to consider it a good value investment.

The question is, if fundamental valuations have not been present since, say, the mid '80s, do they still have merit? The argument for why fundamental analysis is flawed for Vancouver real estate goes as follows. Real estate consists of cash flows from rents and capital appreciation. The Vancouver market has had many boom-bust cycles in its past. Even if an investor buys when prices are above fundamental value (not necessarily at the peak, mind), a subsequent boom cycle will allow the investor to exit with a decent overall return. Booms and busts are inherent to Vancouver's psyche. Given enough time, typically 7-10 years, you will always be able to cash out positive, the caveat being of course you avoid buying near or at the peak. Fundamental valuation is therefore rarely, if ever, achieved because investors anticipate future bubbles to compensate for poor rental yields.

In a nutshell, that is the argument. And before commenters rip it apart I will say that many people over the past generation have made decent real (or paper…) returns in this fashion. Most I have had discussions with do not engage in "pure" speculation (i.e. flipping) but actually rely mostly on rents for their return; "mostly" because for the return to really make sense they require some form of capital appreciation above inflation. The speculative component (i.e. prices above fundamentals) is apparently omnipresent within a typical investor's time frame.

The Vancouver price graph is indeed "biased" above fundamental value. So the argument goes, as I can make it out, you may have to wait a long long time for true fundamental valuations to return. If this is true, that Vancouver has a propensity for speculation, prices may never retreat to fundamentals in one's lifetime. In fact this is effectively the argument I hear on local blogs and amongst my acquaintances and family. Really they are saying that Vancouver is full of greater fools who will inevitably compensate us for poor cash flows or that their still fruitless but eternal hope of real income growth will manifest itself. And maybe they are right.

Of course speculation is a zero sum game and many we know have done well in the past generation in their real estate investments, "others" not so much. Here though I lob a few words of caution into the hubris.

First the assumption that Vancouver will experience another boom-bust cycle in most investors' time horizons is just that -- an assumption. There are precedents in other cities, most notably Tokyo, where prices have fallen for twenty years and counting. The market there had the ability to absorb a significant amount of investors with speculative components to their business cases and not lead to a subsequent boom; in other words a lot of speculators got burned waiting for the recovery that was not. Indeed the Japanese property market remained rational longer than speculators could remain solvent. Not to say this will not happen in Vancouver, but convincing yourself it won't is a high stakes assumption nonetheless.

Second is that oversupply this time around may all but guarantee a return to fundamentals. There are just not enough people for the number of units being built and, worse, we have seen Vancouver's population "spread out" from past decades. That is, the ratio of occupied bedrooms to the total number of bedrooms has been decreasing for the past decade due to what I believe to be both a demographic shift, and historically low and lasting unemployment (due in significant part to the construction boom as it happens). What is to stop this trend from reversing when average wages are falling? If you think mohican's graph of CMHC units under construction is scary, wait until under-productive dwellings are brought back to more full productivity as people tighten their belts.

Third the past generation has seen a perpetual reduction in mortgage rates and mortgage qualification thresholds from their highs in the early '80s. This in turn has improved affordability for existing owners and pushed up prices for future ones who can still miraculously tap credit lines. That trend is unlikely to continue much further. If mortgage rates increase, it will be decidedly bad for affordability. If mortgage approvals are stricter, fewer can qualify to buy at all. And prices will suffer.

It comes down to one thing, that Vancouver real estate has had a lengthy CV of booms and busts with a distinct bias above what would be justified by fundamentals. As an investor, you may well be relying on Vancouver's house price volatility to ensure your overall returns are satisfactory. Food for thought, though, that THIS time, it may indeed be different, though not in a good way for your future savings. On the flipside, for families looking to buy a personal residence only at fundamental value, there is some chance you could be waiting a long time, though perhaps not.

Calamity on the Creek

I enjoyed reading the updates on the Olympic Village fiasco at Frances Bula and Condohype.

What I found striking in reading Bula and other journalists is that what they consider the 'worst case scenario' for the condo market is actually *still* pretty much in the lands of hopes and dreams. The scenarios they seem to be running are things like 20% off pricing, or waiting 2 or 3 years until the market 'comes back.' What I find striking is how people that are intelligent and presumably well-informed seem to be unable to clearly see where this market is going.

Here's one thing that Frances said:

Being a fence-sitter, as my loving critics like to call me, I find myself as unconvinced by those who say (with considerable glee) that the housing market as we knew it will never EVER return to anything near what it was as by those who thought condos would keep selling like cheap underwear at Wal-Mart.

What does she mean by 'what it was'? Yes, people will continue to buy and sell condos. At some point, sales will rebound. They will in fact again sell like underwear at Walmart. But at what price? Does she mean 2007 pricing? Of course, in nominal terms this will happen at some point, but not any time soon.

Here's how I see it. No, prices will not fall forever and they won't fall to zero. Instead, with speculators out of the market, the bottom for prices will be set by cash-flow investors and/or rent vs. buy residents. If these people need, say, a 7% gross yield on investment, then in order to get $1000/sf (which is the number bandied around as break-even for the Olympic Village), we need to see rents at (1000*.07/12)=$5.83/sf per month. This means that a 1000sf condo rents for $5830. Now, the Oly Village might be nice and ultraluxury and all that, but I think it will be awhile until incomes rise to allow $5.83/sf.

Now, maybe one of these assumptions is wrong. Maybe speculators will return to the market and blow a new bubble. Could happen, but I doubt it will happen in the next few years. Maybe investors don't need 7% gross. I don't know. But I'm pretty sure that, while not forever, it will be a l o n g time before rents justify $1000/sf.

Look. It's as simple as this graph. Forget the politics. Forget the legal mumbo jumbo. Forget Bob Rennie's new age condo spin. What people are apparently still not getting is that a 'return to normal' does not mean returning to 2007. It was 2003-2007 that is the anomaly; not 2008-09.



[note: updated graph to Q3 2008. Data here.]
UPDATE: Here is Gary Mason in today's G&M. My impression of Mason is that he is a hard-nosed, cynical journalist. Yet he is still caught in the hype:

The city may be able to take the long view and hold on to unsold condominiums until the economy and real-estate market turn around and the value of the units returns to something resembling what they were expected to be about now.

Then again, that might not be for another six or seven years. No one knows.

See, his worst case scenario is that the market recovers to 2007 wish prices (not actual prices, but the 2007 presale wish prices) in 6 or 7 years. Not. Going. To. Happen.

The Ownership Premium

No analysis blog would be complete without a paradox and I believe there is none more relevant now than the so-called "ownership premium" that owner-occupiers place on property values. I would like to offer an alternate view of the so-called "ownership premium" that has been discussed on this blog and others in the past years.

The "ownership premium", sometimes called the "control premium", is a premium that a potential buyer will pay for the right of owning (and "controlling") a property compared to renting. Here is an example thought process of how the premium concept works, from a buyer's perspective:

jesse is renting a condominium for $1200 per month but is on a month-to-month lease. With a wife and young child, jesse does not want the uncertainty of renting month-to-month and his wife wants to customize the suite, something not always possible when renting. jesse looks at the condo for sale next door. If he were to buy it at market rate, the total costs of doing so far exceed that of continuing to rent. After factoring in all expected costs and trade-offs, jesse decides he is willing and able to pay a monetary premium to buy. But – and here's the thing – he doesn't have to.

The alternate view of the ownership premium looks not at individual circumstances but at the overall market comprised of owner-occupiers and investors competing over the same product. Here, for simplicity, we can look at condominiums that have a healthy mix of both owner-occupiers and investors. If owner-occupiers will pay a market premium to own, the investor must compete by also paying the same premium. This has the effect of reducing the investor's yield and instead must rely on capital gains to compensate for the poor yield.

In speculative bubbles, low rental yields go virtually unnoticed because everybody is "making money" on capital appreciation. Investors can compete head-to-head with owner-occupiers because rental yield is dwarfed by capital appreciation. The "ownership premium" train of thought becomes justified, even amongst many investors who justify it as a premium for scarcity and control of how the property is used. During bubbles, the premium continually increases.

However, when a bubble deflates, total return is not about capital appreciation but net income from rents. At this point the investor will require higher rents or lower prices to make the investment worthwhile. Housing markets around the world are starting to revert to where cash flows make sense again and this means lower prices. Rising rents are next to impossible when there is an oversupply of dwellings and wages are flat to falling with rising unemployment. The ownership premium, for investors, is once again meaningless.

This does not mean that the ownership premium for owner-occupiers is a fallacy. It exists and is real. In addition, for many others, the mobility and lower responsibility offered by renting means their personal premiums are negative. The point is that it doesn't matter. When a significant portion of a market is focused on monetary returns ex intangible benefits – i.e. investors –they will eventually and invariably set the price. It also doesn't mean anyone is necessarily wrong for paying a premium but ones doing so should not use it to justify high prices and instead realize they made an investment with a lower monetary return.

Edit: the "ownership premium", as described here, is in its essence describing one's personal preference to own or rent a property -- the "intangibles" of ownership. It is not to do with more tangible premiums related to speculation of future price gains or expected increased utility by densification. The point is the intangibles of ownership do not in themselves justify higher prices.

Greater Vancouver Prices Decline Dramatically for 7 Months in a Row

Data from REBGV Press Release.

2008 certainly was an interesting year for real estate market observers in Vancouver. For nearly 2 years the local market bucked the declining price trends seen in the US and elsewhere. Pundits had proclaimed that the local market was immune or insulated from the turmoil elsewhere. Oh how wrong they were. Benchmark detached home prices in the Greater Vancouver area are now at the same level as they were in June 2006.

This story is really all about supply and demand. There is lots of supply with even more coming and very little demand. Active listings are significantly above previous year's levels so the supply side is not helping those who want higher prices.


One may look to the demand side of the equation for some hope for some price appreciation but monthly sales are at half the level they were during the boom years with no quick fixes in sight.

Consequently, it would take a very long time, 16.4 months to be exact, for the current level of inventory to be sold off at the current rate of sales. This essentially means that the market is completely saturated with product and the only sales to be seen are the deep discounts.


The correlation between months of inventory and price changes is extremely tight with any MOI level above 7 MOI indicating further price declines. At the current level of more than double that, I do not expect rising prices anytime soon.

As mentioned previously, prices are now back at mid-2006 levels and the retreat has only begun. I fully expect inventory to swell in the new year and sales to continue at a lacklustre pace which will put continued and significant negative price pressure on sellers for the next while.

Good luck to everyone.