BC Population Growth to Q2 2012

BC Stats released its quarterly population estimates and BC continues sluggish growth through Q2 2012.

Population growth consists of the following bulk components:

• Natural increase (births - deaths)
• Net interprovincial migration
• Net international migration (including permanent and non-permanent residents (NPRs))

So let's look at how recent quarters look in a historical context (there is seasonality so quarters are best compared to each other):

The most recent Q2-2012 data indicate continued negative net interprovincial migration (1196 net out of the province), though net international migration was more robust than the same period in 2011.

Below are graphs of annual NPR migration and annual population growth up to 2011. Note net NPR migration implies that this influx permanently changes population. That is, in net, NPRs either effectively remain NPRs within Canada permanently or convert to permanent residents.

In terms of immigration class, below is a year-on-year comparison of the various immigration classes entering BC in Q2:
Class Q2'11 Q2'12
Family 2593 3195
Refugee 495 392
Skilled Worker 3054 2937
Canadian Experience 145 382
Provincial Nominee 1332 1611
Live-in Caregiver 654 513
Entrepreneur 43 24
Investor 1079 647
Self-Employed 17 17
Other 257 305
Total 9669 10023

Population growth through second quarter of 2012 is below its peak of late last decade, due in most part to net out-migration to other provinces and average immigration. Growth has at least temporarily stabilized at 2011 levels and roughly in-line with the average of the past decade. Out migration is of continued concern, with more people leaving the province than arriving.

Will population growth save house prices from "crashing"? There is not much evidence it will, however it will go some way to ensure any housing oversupply that typically results from significant house price drops can be absorbed more quickly. Conversely lower population growth tends to prolong downturns. Residential units under construction are approaching all-time highs again so we should not be too surprised population growth has not cratered in this recent estimate.

Betting on Vancouver's House Price Crash

A (thinly-traded) bet on prediction market Intrade is as follows: "Monthly House Price Index for Vancouver to be 121 or less before the end of 2013". The "House Price Index" is the Teranet HPI. The Vancouver Teranet HPI is currently 170, roughly at its all-time high. To hit 121 means a 30% drop in about 16 months for this bet to pay.

If Vancouver were to follow the US's trend the chart below showing HPI changes from peak gives some indication at how precipitously Vancouver's HPI could drop below 121. Note that the US cities did not experience house price crashes at the same time -- Seattle most notably was delayed by about a year or so -- but look at how closely the brunt of the price drops were aligned from peak, roughly 12-24 months after.

The graph below includes two measures for Vancouver, one with the peak at June of 2012, the other with a "shifted" de facto peak of August 2011. This was done because as one can see from the US cities the peaks were followed by about a year of mulling near or at peak prices before dropping significantly. If one assumes that the actual "peak" for Vancouver was August 2011 and the HPI is now at the advent of that "Wile-E-Coyote" moment, the pregnant pause before the big push downwards, one could think Vancouver has a fighting chance to hit the "121 or less" threshold before EOY2013 target.

Betting on the Intrade contract being true looks to be in effect arguing that Vancouver's "peak" was actually last year and that Vancouver is set for a US-style house price crash. Place your bets.

Affordability and Rents in Vancouver

City of Vancouver mayor Gregor Robertson's affordability task force put their report on the table today, the full report is here (PDF). One thing I thought I might highlight is the state of rentals in the Greater Vancouver region, using two measures.

The first measure is taking the ratio of CPI-reported "rented accommodation" to median regional household income and normalizing:

The second measure is taking the same income but using CMHC surveyed rents

The discrepancy between the two measures is marked, certainly something I would investigate further if I had the time.

Despite the discrepancy, both graphs indicate that, in terms of median incomes, rents in Greater Vancouver have not drifted significantly over the past 20 years. That does not necessarily mean there is no regional affordability problem for certain income tiers or regions (such as the City of Vancouver proper) but on balance I don't see much evidence to support Vancouver being significantly less affordable in terms of baseline shelter costs compared to the past two decades, though last year's CMHC data indicate affordability measures are near the top end of the band, mostly due to income stagnation but also in part due to increasing real rents.

Something to keep in mind when considering the recommendations of an "affordability task force".

Mortgage Spreads

This is a quick look at Canadian 5-year mortgage spreads. I am not a financial analyst or anything, but here are the data using some basic calculations. Here are the mortgage rates: the posted rate, the "average" rate that includes discounts from posted, and the rate listed on RateHub that tracks the maximum discounted rate.

Mortgage rates are dependent upon the real rate of interest, inflation expectations, and an additional spread that includes the spread between risk-free and mortgage securities as well as servicer markups. I have graphed the three components (real rate, inflation, and additional spread) of the 5-year average mortgage rate below:

The inflation expectation is calculated by taking the difference between the long Government of Canada real return bond and the Government of Canada long bond. The real 5 year rate is calculated according to the Fisher equation, however I used the long breakeven rate (BER) and not the 5-year BER when calculating inflation expectations.

The "spread" has been increasing since the beginning of 2011. Recent reduced mortgage rates seem to be attributable to lower real rates and lowered inflation expectations. By these calculations, the real spread from risk-free has been higher than before the 2008 recession.

July 2012 CMHC Data - Vancouver CMA

Here are mohican/VHB's charts for housing starts, completions, and under construction for Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) to July 2012, with August preliminary housing start data:

The last few months have seen a continued lag of completions and an increasing amount of starts and under construction volume. Completions are trending upwards but the delay relative to starts is on the long end of what has occurred historically. We should anticipate an eventual increase in completions through the remainder of 2012 and into 2013.

Here is a breakdown of the new persons per bedroom start and completion, assuming 4 bedrooms per detached and 1.6 bedrooms per multi. The higher the number the more population growth there is per start/completion and this would tend to lead to higher unit absorption. In contrast a lower value would mean less absorption. As we can see Vancouver new persons per bedroom-start continues to trend lower once again, in part due to lower population growth of late.

Below we can see a continued high level of multi-unit construction compared to detached construction.

One of the risks facing Vancouver and BC GDP growth is a continued below-trend population growth due in part to unemployment differentials with other parts of the country, in turn wrought by over-investment, particularly in residential structures. If this event occurs, one need only refer to the early 2000s to see the starts and completions are likely to head, and what that would mean for construction employment and BC's GDP growth.

Should population growth remain subdued, resulting lower GDP growth of future years would, in my view, be most reasonably attributed to previous investment excesses, not then current conditions.

Bubbles, Valuations, and Speculation

The blogosphere has been running ragged over recent comments from Tsur Somerville regarding whether or not Vancouver is in a "bubble".

“'You can’t burst a bubble that wasn’t there,' said Somerville. 'But you can have prices above where they should be and it not be a ­bubble.'

'A bubble isn’t just defined by high prices,' he said.

Somerville identified a housing 'bubble' as conditions akin to what was happening in 2007. 

'It didn’t matter what the condo looked like or what it’s going to look like or who was building it, people were lined up around the block and snapping it up,' he said. 'They were saying, "I’ll take 12, please." That’s more of a bubble environment.'"

This piqued my interest because I don't think Somerville would state this without having some arguable justification for it, then I remembered a post on the subject written in 2005 from Calculated Risk. According to him, when we’re talking about "bubbles" we should be talking about speculation and over-valuation, and I think this recent post from him, and the one linked that he wrote in 2005, are must-reads. In the 2005 post he states:

"A bubble requires both overvaluation based on fundamentals and speculation. It is natural to focus on an asset’s fundamental value, but the real key for detecting a bubble is speculation – the topic of this post. Speculation tends to chase appreciating assets, and then speculation begets more speculation, until finally, for some reason that will become obvious to all in hindsight, the 'bubble' bursts. Speculation is key"

There is little doubt for me that Vancouver's fundamentals are out of whack. By my measure price-rent ratios are at least 70% higher than their long-term average.

What Tsur Somerville is stating is that “speculation” is not occurring so there is no “bubble”. What I think may be amiss in this reasoning is considering the possibility that "speculation" did occur but hasn't yet unwound. Instead the speculative excesses witnessed last decade in the means described by Somerville were held in stasis for 4 years with cratering real rates and opening the barn door to 100% mortgage loan underwriting during the aftermath of the 2008 recession. The speculative excesses Somerville is pointing to as absent could still be with us, the participants given a stay. Even that aside, speculation occurs in other ways besides the abject cases of flippers. As Calculated Risk noted:

"This type of speculation appears to be rampant only in certain regions, mostly the coastal areas. However, something akin to speculation is more widespread – homeowners using substantial leverage with escalating financing such as ARMs or interest only loans."

In the more recent article he concludes:

"...the real causes of the bubble were rapid changes in the mortgage lending industry combined with a lack of regulatory oversight. The speculators just added to the fire."

“Rapid changes in the mortgage lending industry” occurred in Canada in the form of falling interest rates through the 2000s and kicking out borrowing terms to 0-40 (zero down payment and 40 year amortization schedule), then slowly relinquishing them to the current 30 year amortization for uninsured and 5-25 for insured. The underwriting of loans via a 100% government backstop certainly helped to lower spreads. I have graphed the effect here by looking at a normalized maximum loan amount using average 5-year mortgage rates, assuming a fixed income and fixed debt-service ratio.

An insured or uninsured borrower could withdraw 60% more in income-flat terms than he/she could in 2000 at the peak in the three years after the 2008 recession. In current conditions there is a marked gap between those who are applying for insured and uninsured loans. An uninsured loan, all else equal, still commands 60% more loan than 12 years ago, an insured loan by contrast is now about 30% more.

The “lack of regulatory oversight” was true in the US and I don’t see the same severity in Canada. That stated, recent moves in Canada by OSFI indicate oversight is now being bolstered and they’re not finished. Despite Canada’s “sound” banking oversight, banks are looking like my dog after I come home and there’s garbage on the kitchen floor. Dogs do what dogs do, and I don’t blame her for being a dog.

A trip down to the epicentres of the US housing bubbles and reading of the lending practices allowed to occur over the last decade there indicate to me Canada is not in the same situation as the US but that is not to say Canada gets a free pass. Tracking lending malfeasance is difficult in part because it is necessarily obfuscated not only by borrowers for various reasons, but also by some lenders who understand they are obtaining free lunches at the expense of direct systematic risks borne mostly by the populace and the government. That should count for something.

Likewise the attitudes I hear in Vancouver regarding housing are markedly different from conversations I have with Americans six years after the US housing bubble peaked. That difference in attitude is interesting and perhaps cautionary as to how much outstanding "speculation" Vancouver still carries.

BC Employment by Sector August 2012

Below are some graphs highlighting BC's employment over the past 15 years in various sectors. But first here are the historical employment, participation, and unemployment rates (CANSIM table 282-0117)

And the spreads between the rest of BC and Vancouver CMA.

Here are the contributions of the two major goods producing sectors (construction and manufacturing) as a percentage of total employment. These are seasonally unadjusted with 3 month moving average applied (CANSIM table 282-0111).

And the service producing sectors (pardon the non-seasonally-unadjusted data, but look at codes 61 and 62!).

Commentary:

A rebound of manufacturing sector employment can plausibly indicate some degree of job reclassification rather than a sectoral shift in employment. To highlight this, I have charted is the 12-month moving-average correlation and slope of construction and manufacturing employment as % of workforce. What this chart shows is that over the past year construction and manufacturing employment changes have been near perfectly negatively correlated and a near 1-1 offset of construction jobs to manufacturing jobs. This is not necessarily proof of re-classification but it is certainly something I would consider as plausible.

Construction employment is still high relative to its historical limits of the past 15 years and remains a larger part of BC's workforce than previous. If construction were to stumble closer to levels seen earlier in the century, there is some hope that manufacturing can fill at least some of the gap, though if construction job flux is simply being reclassified as manufacturing and does not represent a secular rotation, BC's dependency on construction employment is not abating and remains an elevated risk to future economic growth. This is an important factor for BC as there is indication that sectors that are "non-tradeable" are more prone to prolonged high unemployment when coupled with elevated regional debt-income ratios, the latter a situation in which BC unfortunately finds itself. The recent correlation of construction to manufacturing is of some concern as it indicates that some of BCs manufacturing employment is in effect "non-tradeable".

In sum it appears on balance that BC's economy has continued to slowly recover alongside the rest of North America, but the most recent data indicate BC is far from out of the woods.

A Rare Post Worth Reading

Asset manager, blogger and twitterer (?) Morally Bankrupt wrote some thoughts on the factors affecting US house prices over the next few years.

"With mortgage rates near record lows, due both to low inflation and negative real rates, the leveraged purchasing power of real wages is near historic maximums. Additionally, for the most part, it looks like the bottom is in for housing price declines. Does this make it a good time to buy leveraged real-estate to capture future price appreciation while financing it at low rates? I do not think it's as clear as many people think it is."

I encourage "housing analysts", both professional and amateur, (me being the latter) to read the post to understand why. One of the big takeaways is on how mortgage payments that vary linearly with debt amounts relate to changing rates that affect affordability geometrically:

"For home prices to sustainably exceed inflation, wage gains have to outpace inflation by more than the increase in rates over that same time period... [P]urchasing power increases at an increasing rate as rates decline... [A]t a fixed interest rate, purchasing power increases at a stable rate with payment. This means that for home prices to sustainably increase, growth in wages not only has to outpace inflation, but it has to outpace it by a margin wide enough to compensate for losses in purchasing power from any changes in the mortgage rate during that same period."

This has implications for the Canadian housing situation as well. The conclusion:

"Depressed real estate prices and low financing rates are leading many to see the current climate as a golden opportunity to buy leveraged real-estate, but price increases are not guaranteed, and the pay-out on a leveraged bet on housing is dependent many different factors. While affordability remains high and payments as % of income are near historic lows due to the Fed's extremely accommodating policy, an economic recovery can put an end to Fed accommodation and suspension of the Fed's MBS reinvestment program would be reflected on both, the risk-free interest rate and the spread at which MBS trade, turning a tailwind into a headwind for price appreciation. Leveraged buyers also run the risk of near-term price declines or inflation rates below the rate priced in by nominal rates. Leveraged real estate requires price appreciation and/or profits from rents to outpace the rate of inflation built-in to interest rates, which as we already saw, is not near lows. 

"I don't have an opinion on whether residential real-estate is a good or bad investment, it's not my line of work, but I think many investors are failing to see that a leveraged bet on real-estate price appreciation is, indirectly, a bet on inflation exceeding current inflation expectations and future wages increasing at a rate faster than inflation. Under an inflationary environment, increases in the real price level of real estate would require a mix of an increase in the % of income spent on housing and real wages in order to allow growth in outlays to outpace the loss in purchasing power created by any increase in real-rates, inflation expectations, or mortgage spreads."

Fall Sales Rebound in Greater Vancouver?

The mantra I sometimes hear in early September is that there is a "summer lull" and that sales in the fall, once buyers return from vacation, will improve relative to the summer. To put this to the test I pulled Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver monthly sales volumes from the last 13 years and measured the percentage change in sales from the month of August to the months of September through November to see if sales volumes do pick up in the fall. To show this I have binned the percentage changes of these three months in 5% increments and plotted them in a histogram below

Compared to August, the months of September, October, and November have had:

"Worse" < -5%

• September 5/13
• October 6/13
• November 7/13
• Total 18/39 (46%)

"About the same" -5%-5%

• September 7/13
• October 2/13
• November 5/13
• Total 14/39 (36%)

"Better" > 5%

• September 1/13
• October 5/13
• November 1/13
• Total 7/39 (18%)

In other words only 18% of the fall months in the past 13 years have been "better" than the previous August's numbers. 46% are "worse", and 36% are "about the same".

If you're looking for a sales trend to lead to increased sales in the fall, using August's sales as a gauge, it's not looking so good. Further, though I didn't display the numbers, if you are predicting at least one month in September through November with sales at least 5% better than August, you would be right 5/13 times. 

We can look at average monthly sales change of September through November from August to see how persistent fall sales are:

Only 3 of the last 13 years saw average monthly September through November sales increase over August by at least 5%.

The Mortgage Renewal Gap

Something that used to be tracked on local blogs (by Van Housing Blogger) is the so-called "renewal gap" that asks the question, what interest rate differential (IRD) would someone see if they renewed their mortgage today? This is calculated by looking at the mortgage rate N years ago, where N is the length of the term, and subtracting it from the current mortgage rate.

There are both posted and "discounted" mortgage rates and Ben Rabidoux pointed out to me that this spread has been increasing recently due to some "mortgage wars" reported between vendors chasing yield (or whatever). To help weed through this, with Ben's help, I have found three data series of mortgage rates:

• The "posted" mortgage rate tracked by the Bank of Canada on its website (V122521)
• The "average" mortgage rate surveyed by CMHC from its lending partners (CANSIM Table 176-0043)
• The mortgage rate tracked by Ratehub, which tracks discounted rates.

The first graph looks at the 5 year rates from these three data sources:

And the spreads between the data series:

The renewal gap of the average and posted rates, with the spread between the two, is as follows. I have assumed future rates maintain July 2012 values indefinitely into the future. (This could be slightly improved by using bond futures to provide best-estimate of rates going forward.) (The Ratehub and average have almost exactly the same renewal gap calculation)

Here is the posted renewal gaps for 1, 3, and 5 year terms:

Analysis:

• The 1 and 3 year posted renewal gaps are now roughly zero. That means borrowers on these term lengths will not see much debt relief upon renewal going forward. This is a big change from 2011 when the 3 year posted had average IRDs under -2%.
• The 5 year renewal gap is markedly negative, to the tune of close to -2.6%. Absent any significant interest rate moves or changes to discounting this will continue for another 16 months or so after which the renewal gap shrinks close to zero again. This means that the fraction of households whose mortgages are up for renewal in the next while are able to significantly reduce their financing costs, all else equal.
• The "mortgage wars" where significant discounts are being offered compared to posted rates have been increasing over the past year.
• It should be no surprise the Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada have acted by clawing back amortization lengths, twisting rates, limiting refinancings, and taking OSFI's machete to bank lending practices (to name a few), given the large and persistent negative IRD on 5 year term renewals.

The renewal gap on mortgages is still accommodative but 2012 has seen some tightening due to the 3 year gap hovering around zero again. The 5 year gap is still markedly negative and this will tend to be a tailwind for the economy as borrowers continue to refinance in favourable conditions. That, taken by itself, is a bullish indicator for housing over the next year or so. Whether households are increasing their debtloads upon renewal or keeping their original amortization schedules is another discussion.

Greater Vancouver Market Snapshot August 2012

Below are updated sales, inventory and months of inventory graphs for Greater Vancouver to August 2012. (see REBGV news releases.)

The scatterplot of price changes and months of inventory is now being regularly updated:

Commentary:

August continued with relative weakness compared to not only 2011 but also past years from 2005 (except the residual emerging from the recession of 2008-2009). August sales are the second lowest in the past decade, though close to levels seen in 2008.

This August was another weak report. Sales year-to-date are bad and this has direct effects on incomes of those who depend on resale turnover for income. This level of sales, if they continue to be weak, is going to translate into higher months of inventory for the rest of the year (MOI is typically higher in the latter half of the year; an MOI of around 6 normally translates to flat prices) and concomitant price drops already starting to rear their heads in the posted MLS benchmark prices and medians. Prices (as measured by the Teranet HPI) will likely be year-on-year negative by the end of the summer.

As a recurring reminder, there are some worrying clouds on the horizon: population growth is falling, dwelling completions are set to increase in the latter half of the year, and banks are beginning to implement stricter mortgage guidelines in the form of changes to government-underwritten mortgage insurance qualification criteria and second, to commence very soon, via implementation of stricter mortgage lending guidelines under OSFI's new directives. Further stress in current conditions can be attributed to China's slowing economic growth.

On the other hand mortgage rates remain low, near net zero real territory, and it is possible for rates to remain low for a prolonged period (i.e. years). It looks likely that Asian economies are due for another round of investment spending through coordinated government stimulus measures -- not only in Asia but also in other jurisdictions -- and that can plausibly lead to a renewed, but in my view temporary, bout of current account flows into Vancouver-area property investments.

Three quick notes. First is that another good measure of relative market strength and weakness is the "sell to newlist" ratio, or the ratio of sales to new listings over a given interval. This measure is similar to months of inventory and provides an indication how fast properties are being tendered relative to them being sold. A higher sell-newlist ratio is bullish for prices, a lower sell-newlist ratio is bearish for prices. Vancouver Housing Blogger presented sell-newlist data here at the beginning of this year. The sell-newlist for 2012 has been below the average level for the past 10 years and prices have been relatively weak.

Second there are pockets of relative strength and weakness in the Vancouver area. Richmond, Vancouver West, and West Vancouver detached sales have markedly slowed for most of the year and prices are beginning to come off their highs. Other areas such as Vancouver East and Coquitlam have been relatively strong. This post deals with aggregate sales without delving into sub regions or housing types so please read the press release or talk to your local real estate busybodies to get a feel for "what's up".

Third I put together a slideshow on some housing market mechanics basics using Vancouver data. I'll be producing a few more over the next while geared towards different audiences. The goal is to provide a summary of the pertinent analysis mohican, VHB, and other local bloggers have done on Vancouver's market. This one is geared more for someone who has a bit of finance background.

In aggregate, yet another weak report for resale housing activity in the Vancouver area.

July 2012 Teranet House Price Index

OME PRICES IN JULY UP 4.8% FROM A YEAR EARLIER Monthly changes in the Teranet-National Bank National Composite House Price Index™ tend to be greater in May and June of each year. True to form, this year's July increase was 0.7% after monthly rises of more than 1% in both May and June. The July gain, the fifth in a row, nevertheless took the index to a new high for a third consecutive month. The composite gain was exceeded in four of the 11 metropolitan markets surveyed: prices were up 2.0% in Hamilton, Quebec City and Victoria and 1.6% in Toronto. The other seven markets lagged the composite: rises of 0.6% in Ottawa-Gatineau, 0.4% in Edmonton and Montreal, 0.3% in Winnipeg, 0.2% in Calgary and 0.1% in Halifax, with a decline of 0.5% in Vancouver. The Vancouver retreat, the first in five months, ended a run of two months in which prices had not fallen in any of the 11 markets. Halifax has had the longest run of monthly increases, nine, followed closely by Toronto and Montreal with eight each. Teranet – National Bank National Composite House Price Index™

Since monthly changes are subject to seasonal factors, the 12-month change is revealing. In July the composite index was up 4.8% from a year earlier, an eighth consecutive month of deceleration in 12-month inflation. Since prices rose 1.0% from July to August last year, further deceleration is possible in August 2012. However, the only market in which 12-month inflation has followed the national composite in decelerating for eight straight months is Vancouver. In Montreal inflation has decelerated in seven of the last eight months. Four of the 11 markets show 12-month inflation exceeding the national average: Toronto 9.2%, Winnipeg 7.4%, Hamilton 5.9% and Halifax 5.4%. The 12-month gain was 4.3% in Montreal, 4.2% in Quebec City, 3.4% in Ottawa-Gatineau, 2.5% in Edmonton, 1.6% in Vancouver and 1.1% in Calgary. Despite Victoria's sharply monthly rise, its prices were down 0.4% from a year earlier. Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ The historical data of the Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ is available at www.housepriceindex.ca. Metropolitan area Index level July % change m/m % change y/y Calgary 160.68 0.2 % 1.1 % Edmonton 167.40 0.4 % 2.5 % Halifax 140.92 0.1 % 5.4 % Hamilton 136.41 2.0 % 5.9 % Montreal 150.19 0.4 % 4.3 % Ottawa 141.95 0.6 % 3.4 % Quebec 173.16 2.0 % 4.2 % Toronto 147.32 1.6 % 9.2 % Vancouver 172.44 -0.5 % 1.6 % Victoria 143.15 2.0 % -0.4 % Winnipeg 188.40 0.3 % 7.4 % National Composite 6 154.50 0.6 % 5.1 % National Composite 11 155.28 0.7 % 4.8 % The Teranet–National Bank House Price Index™ is estimated by tracking observed or registered home prices over time using data collected from public land registries. All dwellings that have been sold at least twice are considered in the calculation of the index. This is known as the repeat sales method; a complete description of the method is given at www.housepriceindex.ca The Teranet–National Bank House Price Index™ is an independently developed representation of average home price changes in six metropolitan areas: Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax. The national composite index is the weighted average of the six metropolitan areas. The weights are based on aggregate value of dwellings as retrieved from the 2006 Statistics Canada Census. According to that census1, the aggregate value of occupied dwellings in the metropolitan areas covered by the indices was $1.168 trillion, or 53% of the Canadian aggregate value of $2.207 trillion. All indices have a base value of 100 in June 2005. For example, an index value of 130 means that home prices have increased 30% since June 2005. By: Marc Pinsonneault Senior Economist Economy & Strategy Group National Bank of Canada Teranet - National Bank House Price Index™ thanks the author for their special collaboration on this report. 1 Value of Dwelling for the Owner-occupied Non-farm, Non-reserve Private Dwellings of Canada.