Housing Bubble? | Leith Wheeler Investment Counsel Ltd.
Great piece of analysis from Leith Wheeler.
Friday, December 21, 2012
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Teranet House Price Index for December 2012
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The composite index was down 0.4% from October. It was the fourth November monthly decline in 13 years of data, including November 2008 when the country was on the verge of recession. For the first time since February 2009, when the recession was in full swing, prices were down from the month before in 10 of the 11 metropolitan markets surveyed. For Quebec City (−0.1%) and Victoria (−0.9%) it was the fourth straight monthly decline. For Montreal (−0.4%) and Ottawa-Gatineau (−0.5%) it was the third, for Toronto (-0.3%) and Halifax (−0.9%) the second. Prices were also down in Vancouver (-0.6%), Edmonton (−0.9%), Hamilton (-0.3%) and Winnipeg (-0.7%). Only in Calgary were prices up from the month before (0.4%). The Winnipeg and Hamilton markets nevertheless rate as tight by the criterion of seasonally adjusted new listings to sales as published by the Canadian Real Estate Association.Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™  The historical data of the Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ is available at www.housepriceindex.ca.
The Teranet–National Bank House Price Index™ is an independently developed representation of average home price changes in six metropolitan areas: Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax. The national composite index is the weighted average of the six metropolitan areas. The weights are based on aggregate value of dwellings as retrieved from the 2006 Statistics Canada Census. According to that census1, the aggregate value of occupied dwellings in the metropolitan areas covered by the indices was $1.168 trillion, or 53% of the Canadian aggregate value of $2.207 trillion. All indices have a base value of 100 in June 2005. For example, an index value of 130 means that home prices have increased 30% since June 2005.
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Tuesday, December 18, 2012
BC Population Growth to Q3 2012
BC Stats released its quarterly population estimates and BC continues sluggish growth through Q3 2012.
Population growth consists of the following bulk components:
- Natural increase (births - deaths)
- Net interprovincial migration
- Net international migration (including permanent and non-permanent residents (NPRs))
So let's look at how recent quarters look in a historical context, here graphed since 1961 to show longer-term trends (there is seasonality so quarters are best compared to each other, also do not integrate these graphs, the total population is periodically adjusted during census counts):
The most recent Q3-2012 data indicate continued negative net interprovincial migration (2748 net out of the province).
Population growth through third quarter of 2012 is below its peak of late last decade, due in most part to net out-migration to other provinces and below-average net international migration. Q3 growth has dropped 39% since its recent local peak in 2007, meaning population growth this year was about 10,000 fewer in the quarter. This will have a direct and negative impact on housing demand in the coming quarters. Interprovincial out-migration is of continued concern, with more people leaving the province for others than arriving.
Tuesday, December 04, 2012
Greater Vancouver Market Snapshot November 2012
Below are updated sales, inventory and months of inventory graphs for Greater Vancouver to November 2012. (see REBGV news releases.)
The scatterplot of price changes and months of inventory is below. As the Teranet data roll in, look for more points appearing the right-hand side.
Commentary:
November continued with relative weakness compared to not only 2011 but also past years from 2005 (except the residual emerging from the recession of 2008-2009). November sales are near lows in at least the past decade, though above levels seen in 2008.
To partially compensate for weekend framing effects I have plotted sales per working day on a month-by-month basis. Using this more accurate gauge we can see that November is weaker than October and about in-line with September:
This November saw another weak report. Sales year-to-date are bad and this has direct effects on incomes of those who depend on resale turnover for income. I would not be surprised to see the Teranet HPI down between -6% and -4% year-on-year by February or March of 2013.
As a recurring reminder, there are some worrying clouds on the horizon: population growth is falling, dwelling completions are set to increase over the next year if not longer, and banks have implemented stricter mortgage guidelines via changes to government-underwritten mortgage insurance qualification criteria and via implementation of stricter mortgage lending guidelines under OSFI's new directives. (Credit Unions are one notable exception though it appears BC CUs will comply with the brunt of OSFI guidelines.) Further stress in current conditions can be attributed to China's slower economic growth.
On the other hand mortgage rates remain low, near net zero real territory, and it is possible for rates to remain low for a prolonged period (i.e. several years). It looks likely that Asian economies are currently meting out another round of investment spending through coordinated government stimulus measures -- not only in Asia but also in other jurisdictions -- and that can plausibly lead to a renewed, but in my view temporary, bout of current account flows into Vancouver-area property investments.
Based on taking the average ratios of sales in December to sales in September through November from previous years I am estimating December 2012 sales to be 1159 +/- 34 (one sd). Last month I got lucky and my estimate was only off by 14.
Sigh. Yet another weak report for resale housing activity in the Vancouver area. This is not at all pleasant to type.
To partially compensate for weekend framing effects I have plotted sales per working day on a month-by-month basis. Using this more accurate gauge we can see that November is weaker than October and about in-line with September:
This November saw another weak report. Sales year-to-date are bad and this has direct effects on incomes of those who depend on resale turnover for income. I would not be surprised to see the Teranet HPI down between -6% and -4% year-on-year by February or March of 2013.
On the other hand mortgage rates remain low, near net zero real territory, and it is possible for rates to remain low for a prolonged period (i.e. several years). It looks likely that Asian economies are currently meting out another round of investment spending through coordinated government stimulus measures -- not only in Asia but also in other jurisdictions -- and that can plausibly lead to a renewed, but in my view temporary, bout of current account flows into Vancouver-area property investments.
Based on taking the average ratios of sales in December to sales in September through November from previous years I am estimating December 2012 sales to be 1159 +/- 34 (one sd). Last month I got lucky and my estimate was only off by 14.
Sigh. Yet another weak report for resale housing activity in the Vancouver area. This is not at all pleasant to type.
Friday, November 30, 2012
Some Thoughts on Bank of Canada and House Prices
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada John Murray gave a speech to a crowd in New York on global rebalancing. I'm certainly not learned enough to comment meaningfully on his arguments and rationale but he did mention something in subsequent commentary about Canadian housing:
What are the risks of high house prices and debts? Currently there is some risk of external economic shock to incomes, but absent that, with real rates depressed, debt-service ratios are currently for the most part manageable. If rates increase, however, this poses a significant headwind for the Canadian economy and worse could be almost impossible for policymakers to contain the fallout. Luckily, based on the yield curve, it looks as if rates have a good chance of staying low for a prolonged period, perhaps for the rest of the decade. The question then is what does Canada need to do in the coming years to ensure that when interest rates do rise she will not be caught out with excessive debt levels and overinflated asset prices.
Based on Murray's comments we have a smidgen of a clue what the Bank's and government's strategy is on the front of asset price reversion. It looks as if they are trying to pull of a "smooth transition" of prices back to levels that are able to be carried with historical interest rates. If prices continue at current levels (or increase) they will not have reverted quickly enough to stave off a big shock when rates rise. If prices fall too quickly this will lead to situations where a large swathe of owners are in negative equity situations, something that has knock-on effects to the broader economy. Given the assumption the Bank wants to control the band in which prices revert, we can do a quick calculation what that would mean for prices.
Say prices as a ratio to incomes are 40% above their long-term average. To revert prices to this range will require a 30% drop. To do this in seven years requires a -5% annual drop in the price-income ratio. Assuming incomes rise by 2% per year that means national prices need to drop at -3% per year for seven years to revert. If markets like Vancouver are, say, 50% overvalued, that will require prices dropping at -5% per year with 2% annual income gains to revert.
Prices do not often move in a straight line, rather we should expect that price drops will be more severe near the middle of the reversion and less severe near the ends. We can approximate this trajectory as a raised-cosine profile, say
where P is the price, Pi is the initial price, Pf is the final price, x is the year from start of correction, and L is the duration of the reversion target. Below are the year-on-year price change results for a 20% and 30% decline in prices:
But here's the thing -- if prices are to revert in a controlled manner, as regular readers of this blog know, this necessarily requires a certain ratio of for-sale inventory to prices. In other words, to ensure prices drop at a defined rate it will likely mean the government will need to control the level of sales. The only ways I can see them accomplishing such a feat are through controlling immigration intake -- not easy since they don't have much control on where immigrants settle -- and through credit availability.
In short, if the Bank of Canada is indeed "price targeting" so as to attempt to revert housing valuations to their long-term averages in the advent of future interest rate hikes, I believe we can expect further adjustments to controls of credit availability, both looser and tighter, over the coming years. It will remain to be seen how much capacity is left to accumulate additional credit, and where it can be stuffed!
An interesting comment for a "housing analysis" blogger! Murray is commenting that transitioning housing to a more sustainable level is something the Bank is looking for, and on which is likely advising the government to form fiscal policy. So we can play some guessing games as to what the Bank of Canada would like to see for a "smooth transition" and what that means.Canada's heated housing market appears to be cooling as desired, a senior Bank of Canada official said on Tuesday, although he noted that housing starts remain unusually high.
Housing prices and construction in Canada roared higher in 2011 amid low interest rates, sparking fears of a U.S.-style bubble. The market started to slow after the government tightened rules on mortgage lending in July, and policy makers hope to see a gradual softening rather than a crash.
"It's still early days. But we're certainly seeing evidence of movement and acceleration in the right direction," Murray told a business audience after giving a speech in New York.
"Some sort of smooth transition, at least on the housing side, is what we're looking for," he said.
What are the risks of high house prices and debts? Currently there is some risk of external economic shock to incomes, but absent that, with real rates depressed, debt-service ratios are currently for the most part manageable. If rates increase, however, this poses a significant headwind for the Canadian economy and worse could be almost impossible for policymakers to contain the fallout. Luckily, based on the yield curve, it looks as if rates have a good chance of staying low for a prolonged period, perhaps for the rest of the decade. The question then is what does Canada need to do in the coming years to ensure that when interest rates do rise she will not be caught out with excessive debt levels and overinflated asset prices.
Based on Murray's comments we have a smidgen of a clue what the Bank's and government's strategy is on the front of asset price reversion. It looks as if they are trying to pull of a "smooth transition" of prices back to levels that are able to be carried with historical interest rates. If prices continue at current levels (or increase) they will not have reverted quickly enough to stave off a big shock when rates rise. If prices fall too quickly this will lead to situations where a large swathe of owners are in negative equity situations, something that has knock-on effects to the broader economy. Given the assumption the Bank wants to control the band in which prices revert, we can do a quick calculation what that would mean for prices.
Say prices as a ratio to incomes are 40% above their long-term average. To revert prices to this range will require a 30% drop. To do this in seven years requires a -5% annual drop in the price-income ratio. Assuming incomes rise by 2% per year that means national prices need to drop at -3% per year for seven years to revert. If markets like Vancouver are, say, 50% overvalued, that will require prices dropping at -5% per year with 2% annual income gains to revert.
Prices do not often move in a straight line, rather we should expect that price drops will be more severe near the middle of the reversion and less severe near the ends. We can approximate this trajectory as a raised-cosine profile, say
P=(Pi-Pf)/2*cos(π*x/L) + (Pi+Pf)/2
where P is the price, Pi is the initial price, Pf is the final price, x is the year from start of correction, and L is the duration of the reversion target. Below are the year-on-year price change results for a 20% and 30% decline in prices:
Assuming the Bank of Canada is serious about price targeting we have some rough estimates of the level of annualized price drops required to pull off this delicate manoeuvre. As a reference, Vancouver looks to be on track for between -4% and -6% annualized price drops in the late winter of 2013.
In short, if the Bank of Canada is indeed "price targeting" so as to attempt to revert housing valuations to their long-term averages in the advent of future interest rate hikes, I believe we can expect further adjustments to controls of credit availability, both looser and tighter, over the coming years. It will remain to be seen how much capacity is left to accumulate additional credit, and where it can be stuffed!
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