Psychology of a Bubble

I stumbled upon this excellent post on the Irvine Housing Blog.

I suggest reading through when you have a few moments to review some of the important markers of a bubble market, how people rationalize purchasing in a bubble, and how it always ends.

Here is a great quote and some useful visuals:

The efficient markets theory does explain the behavior of asset prices in a typical market, but when price change begins to feedback on itself, behavioral finance is the only theory that explains this phenomenon. There is often a precipitating factor causing the break with the normal pattern and releasing the tether from fundamental valuations. During the Great Housing Bubble, the primary precipitating factor was the lowering of interest rates. The precipitating factor simply acts as a catalyst to get prices moving. Once a directional bias is in place, then price-to-price feedback can take over. The perception of fundamental valuation is based solely on the expectation of future price increases, and the asset is always perceived to be undervalued. There are often brave and foolhardy attempts to justify these valuations and provide a rationalization for irrational behavior. Many witnessing the event assume the “smart money” must know something, and there is a widespread belief prices could not rise so much without a good reason. Herd mentality takes over.

Greater Vancouver Sales Data Update

I've compiled a graph of sales in the REBGV (Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver) over the past 12 years.

2010 was a below-average year for sales but not significantly so. As with 2009 there was a surge in Q4 sales that helped muster some respectability to the sales levels. 2011 starts anew; as a friend from Australia recently commented, the markets in Canada and Australia are drifting into uncharted waters.

Happy New Year

REBGV Price Tracking Update

It's been a few months since the housing-analysis price tracker has been updated. I've uploaded the data to an online spreadsheet here for your viewing pleasure. I'll attempt to keep them up to date on a semi-regular basis. Housing markets move slower than frozen molasses. November sales were average historically and Months of Inventory (MOI) is hovering around the flat-line point. HOH = Half-over-Half.

The graph showing the correlation between price changes and months of inventory:

The formatting of the graphs isn't as nice as the ones before however the data are online now for everyone to see.

The deviation in the model of late is interesting but still within acceptable limits (a couple of sigma).

One thing to note is that these data are only showing a correlation to price changes and inventory, simply validating a relationship between prices and supply and demand. Low inventory and high sales will lead to prices being bid up, high inventory and low sales will lead to prices being bid down. Half-over-half price changes happen to be the most highly correlated to MOI. A combination of several delays will likely lead (actually, must lead, for those who think about it) to an even better model but meh.

Teranet Index: September 2010

NOVEMBER 2010

Price declines in all six markets in September Canadian home prices in September were down 1.1% from the previous month, according to the Teranet-National Bank National Composite House Price Index™. The monthly decline ended a string of 16 consecutive increases in the composite index since the last monthly deflation in April 2009. For the first time since February 2009, prices fell in all six of the metropolitan markets surveyed. The declines were 2.4% in Halifax, 2.2% in Calgary, 1.6% in Toronto, 0.5% in Ottawa and 0.3% in Montreal and Vancouver. For Vancouver it was the third consecutive monthly decrease and for Calgary it was the second. This result was reflected in a further deceleration of the 12-month price increase in September, to 7.9% for the composite index. It was the third consecutive month of deceleration, leaving the 12-month rise the smallest since last January. The 12-month increases range quite widely from market to market: 9.2% in Vancouver and Ottawa, 9.0% in Toronto, 7.6% in Montreal, 3.6% in Halifax and 1.7% in Calgary. Teranet – National Bank National Composite House Price Index™ Contact Us For general enquiries: info@housepriceindex.ca For licenses covering all index-linked products, please contact: Simon Côté 514 879-5379 Website www.housepriceindex.ca

In October, according to our calculations based on data from the Canadian Real Estate Association, market conditions were balanced in Canada as a whole, with Calgary presenting a buyer's market. Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ The historical data of the Teranet – National Bank House Price Index™ is available at www.housepriceindex.ca. Metropolitan area Index level September % change m/m % change y/y Calgary 156.89 -2.2 % 1.7 % Halifax 128.07 -2.4 % 3.6 % Montreal 135.67 -0.3 % 7.6 % Ottawa 132.64 -0.5 % 9.2 % Toronto 125.98 -1.6 % 9.0 % Vancouver 154.84 -0.3 % 9.2 % National Composite 137.94 -1.1 % 7.9 % The Teranet–National Bank House Price Index™ is estimated by tracking observed or registered home prices over time using data collected from public land registries. All dwellings that have been sold at least twice are considered in the calculation of the index. This is known as the repeat sales method; a complete description of the method is given at www.housepriceindex.ca The Teranet–National Bank House Price Index™ is an independently developed representation of average home price changes in six metropolitan areas: Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax. The national composite index is the weighted average of the six metropolitan areas. The weights are based on aggregate value of dwellings as retrieved from the 2006 Statistics Canada Census. According to that census1, the aggregate value of occupied dwellings in the metropolitan areas covered by the indices was $1.168 trillion, or 53% of the Canadian aggregate value of $2.207 trillion. All indices have a base value of 100 in June 2005. For example, an index value of 130 means that home prices have increased 30% since June 2005. By: Marc Pinsonneault Senior economist Economy & Strategy Group National Bank Financial Group Teranet - National Bank House Price Index™ thanks the author for their special collaboration on this report. 1 Value of Dwelling for the Owner-occupied Non-farm, Non-reserve Private Dwellings of Canada.

Mark Carney Speaks to Michael Enright

CBC's Sunday Edition's Michael Enright had a 15 minute conversation with Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney. You can listen to the entire interview here (hour 2, about 10 minutes in).

The most cutting point he made is transcribed below, at about 26:00 on hour 2 (emphasis mine):

Michael Enright: You expressed concern publicly for a long time I think from the moment you took the job about household debt in Canada. I think it was running somewhere around $40,000... and you're concerned about that. Interest rates are very low at the moment. Is there a correlation between the lower the interest rate [and] the more likely it is for people to take on more debt?

Mark Carney: Well this is the concern. Interest rates in Canada are low, abnormally low, exceptionally low...

ME: Are they emergency rates do you think?

MC: Well we had them at emergency levels from April of last year, in April of 2009 after the crisis...

ME: Right.

MC: The Lehman crisis. We got them down to 25 basis points and we further increased our balance sheet beyond that. But we moved them up from emergency levels because the Canadian economy is back at the level we were before the crash, we recovered all the jobs we lost during the crash, and things have moved quite positively for Canada. But they're still at exceptionally low levels. And the risk is that Canadians, some Canadians, take on debt on the assumption that interest rates will always be this way.

ME: Or they're here now, they look pretty good and they'll probably stay that way for a while.

MC: Excatly. And particularly when one thinks about mortgage debt, thirty year mortgage debt, that is not a sensible assumption. And our concern is that people will get themselves into positions which will make it very difficult to service their debt.

ME: But you can't say, wait a minute folks, I wouldn't go and buy a summer cottage because something might happen in the next 6 or 8 months. I mean, that would send Bay Street spinning, wouldn't it?

MC. No. We're taking a longer term perspective on it and we're providing as much transparency as we can about the future path of monetary policy, as much as appropriate. The one thing we can say with high degree of certainty is that over a thirty year mortgage interest rates are not going to be at the same level as they are now, they're going to be higher, and that Canadians, individuals, should be comfortable that they can service their debt at higher interest rates, and the banks that lend to them should also be comfortable about that.

That's central banker speak for "Wake the f&%$ up, Canada."

And, for macro nerds, on "currency wars" and exchange rate management:

ME: The huge worry going into the G20 and we read about it all the time... is the possibility of a currency war. First of all what is a "currency war" and if one breaks out is Canada protected?

MC: Well it's not a term that we use but the concern is that there will be a series of countries will engage in what is effectively competitive devaluation. They will hold down the value of their currency relative to others and that the number of these countries and the weight of these countries will be such that unsustainable adjustment will be pushed on other countries...

ME: To do the same...

MC: Yes. And other countries whose currencies float such as Canada. So in the extreme earlier this fall you had roughly 40% of the currencies by trade weight -- with the US dollar -- so in relative importance four of those 10, or 2 out of 5 of the currencies that trade with the US in importance managing their currencies to some extent.

ME: Gaming the system I guess... Is that what it is? It's like a trade war only you're using currency instead of goods.

MC: Yeah, you're using currency instead of tarriffs, and the issue is, the fundamental issue, is that doesn't work in the long term. You can cause damage to the global system in the short term, but it doesn't work in the long term because ultimately, those adjustments to currencies will come through relative inflation differentials, if nothing else. And if you'll allow me a second, the issue right now is that, let's take between China and the United States, and if China's currency doesn't move, the other way for China's real currency to move, in other words the real value of Chinese goods to increase relative to US goods, which is the same thing in effect, is there to be higher inflation in China than in the US. And what we've seen in the last few months, which we've been saying at the Bank [of Canada] for years, is that Chinese inflation's accelerating and US inflation is decelerating. And so you're getting a more difficult adjustment than you would have if currencies were allowed to adjust.

ME: If the worst-case scenario gets into play, is Canada going to get caught in the crossfire? What protections do we have?

MC: Well we have a number of protections. I think the short answer is no, I mean we're not naive in this situation. We have a number of tools: in the extreme we can intervene in currency markets if extreme movements in our dollar seriously threaten economic outcomes in Canada and those are decisions taken by the Minister of Finance and the [BoC] Governor. They are extreme... but we have tools there. We, very importantly, and I think it's important to understand, our level of currency is very relevant for the Bank of Canada's mandate, obviously. It affects the outlook for inflation in Canada, and if it were to threaten our ability to achieve our inflation target, which is what we're accountable...

ME: the 2%...

MC: The 2%. That's what we're accountable to parliament and Canadians for, we would adjust policy. And we have flexibility in policy here in Canada and we would not hesitate to use it if it were appropriate.