tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post214969293853306023..comments2024-03-26T03:52:23.395-07:00Comments on Housing Analysis: NBR | Behavioral Finance Basics | Your Mind and Your Money |mohicanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06094213357140749289noreply@blogger.comBlogger43125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-72397017427966562282010-05-04T09:54:35.023-07:002010-05-04T09:54:35.023-07:00"Society have been ingrained to believe that ..."Society have been ingrained to believe that real estate always go up, inflation is always positive, etc. Perhaps, maybe that era is passe. Perhaps, we are entering a new normal where deflation and declining real estate is the norm."<br /><br />Perhaps? But, it would reverse the trend of the last few centuries. At least, the trend since WW2. I don't see it happening. Asia is rising. A new day is beginning.JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-34896065577035254352010-05-04T07:23:03.589-07:002010-05-04T07:23:03.589-07:00Well said Mike.Well said Mike.mohicanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06094213357140749289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-64047859720162083892010-05-04T00:26:05.520-07:002010-05-04T00:26:05.520-07:00Bottom line: It's all about supply. In Austral...<i><b>Bottom line: It's all about supply. In Australia, they seems to have handled it badly. In Vancouver, city hall and landowners are ready to approve/sell into a large rally. Where's the bubble?</b></i><br /><br />Instantaneous supply and demand are driven by animal spirits and herd psychology. When prices are perceived to be moving up, supply will be withheld. When players think prices are going down, supply will be increase. Demand behaves in the opposite direction; hence you have overshoots and undershoots. -- This behaviour is true of whether or not you have total information, behave rationally or irrationally. Market players are simply greedy and are trying to maximize profits. <br /><br />Vancouver RE is in a bubble; there is no doubt about it as the price to income is astronomical. The long term trend aways reverts back to the mean.<br /><br />The problem with modern economists is that they alway assume everything is in equilibrium, but markets seldom stay there. They assume linear causality, but the real world is a complex non-linear system containing all sort of dependancies and feedbacks. I don't think economists apply differential equations or dynamic modelling. And so, all economic assumptions are in question. Do jobs drive real estate? or real estate drives jobs? interest rates drive risk taking? or does risk aversion drive down interest rates? etc, etc. These and other key relationships are not standing still. Correlations are always changing. Paradigms shift. <br /><br />Society have been ingrained to believe that real estate always go up, inflation is always positive, etc. Perhaps, maybe that era is passe. Perhaps, we are entering a new normal where deflation and declining real estate is the norm.mikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00118603546135838855noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-20649677602897871922010-05-03T21:30:48.941-07:002010-05-03T21:30:48.941-07:00"I am a believer that while mortgage rates ob..."I am a believer that while mortgage rates obviously affect affordability, low rates cannot justify permanently higher prices".<br /><br /><br />Please note that Canada is not alone. Australia has high and sustained property prices.<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_property_bubble#Factors_increasing_demand_and_decreasing_supply<br /><br />“In a free market, all prices are the result of an equilibrium between supply and demand. For prices to rise, it would indicate supply has fallen and/or that demand has risen. In the case of Australian property, both have occurred …<br /><br />Based on the correlation of median house price divided by gross annual median household income, Australia (with 22 of the 62 severely unaffordable markets) has topped 2010 Demographia ‘International Housing Affordability Survey'. Severely unaffordable markets were considered to ones where price to income ratio was over 5.1. The other podium place-getters in the survey were the UK (silver) and USA (bronze) …<br /><br />The Demographia survey cited “urban consolidation” as one of the main causes for this situation. The “first part of this high-density strategy is to artificially strangle the land supply” evidenced by “Residential land release in Sydney . . reduced from an historic average of 10,000 lots per year to less than 2,000 (in 2007)..” [6]<br /><br />Citing HIA data, the same report stated that “Construction costs of a standardized house rose only 4 percent relative to inflation between 1973 and 2006 in the major capital cities. The price of the land for building has risen nearly 400 percent over the same period, inflation adjusted. This indicates that 98 percent of the increased cost was in the land, not construction.” (See Figure 1) …<br /><br />Feb 2010: After only 3 quarter percent interest rate increases off 50 year lows, 45% of new first home buyers are in mortgage stress and/or defaulting on their loans. <br />With rising interest rates, stricter lending standards and reduced government grants, surveys shows that buyers are giving up the chase indefinitely as property has become completely unaffordable.<br />As interest rates rise, events mirror the sub prime collapse in America...<br /><br />In March 2010 the Sydney Property Market's vacancy rate fell to 0.53%[47] from a high of 2% in August, 2009[48].<br /><br />The rental impact is even more stark for some groups, where for example in Sydney, there is “one affordable and available dwelling for every 15 very low income households.”[49]<br /><br />As noted in the Senate Select Committee 2008 report 'A good house is hard to find', “current supply of rental housing is severely inadequate (chapter 10). Vacancy rates are at record lows”.<br />The report recommended that the NRAS aim at a 50 % increase (an extra 50,000 dwellings) to the notional target by 2012”<br /><br />Bottom line: It's all about supply. In Australia, they seems to have handled it badly. In Vancouver, city hall and landowners are ready to approve/sell into a large rally. Where's the bubble?JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-17505707033425844402010-05-03T15:55:52.797-07:002010-05-03T15:55:52.797-07:00Mohican,
This is completely off topic but do you...Mohican, <br /><br />This is completely off topic but do you have an updated chart of active listings over avg price?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-49945013315397575682010-05-03T15:28:12.346-07:002010-05-03T15:28:12.346-07:00Hi JimTan, I had read this report already. The tim...Hi JimTan, I had read this report already. The time window for their interest rate analysis should be extended for the length of a typical housing cycle and not just a few years.<br /><br />I am a believer that while mortgage rates obviously affect affordability, low rates cannot justify permanently higher prices. It is absolutely debatable however, as some smart people disagree with me!jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155122147972263497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-35563443395853586702010-05-03T14:07:13.493-07:002010-05-03T14:07:13.493-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-9902949811986627322010-05-03T13:59:52.492-07:002010-05-03T13:59:52.492-07:00(The "primeness" of a pool has to do wit...(The "primeness" of a pool has to do with the credit rating of the borrowers but it also has to do with the leverage of the borrowers. For example a borrower with high income and high credit rating but high GDSR should be considered a higher risk to cause the lender pain, even though they may be considered "prime.")<br /><br /><br />Jesse,<br /><br />Seems to me that the CAAMP report covers all that?<br /><br />http://www.caamp.org/meloncms/media/CAAMP%20%20Winter%20Report%20Black.pdfJimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-19532955838619779962010-05-03T11:32:12.288-07:002010-05-03T11:32:12.288-07:00JimTan, it is a valid point that the composition o...JimTan, it is a valid point that the composition of the aggregate pools is still highly tilted towards fixed rate mortgages. What is more important is to look at originated loans, not total outstanding loans. Over the past year or two, there has been a large % increase in VRMs and other less traditional mortgage pools.<br /><br />I do want to append to my previous comments. The "primeness" of a pool has to do with the credit rating of the borrowers but it also has to do with the leverage of the borrowers. For example a borrower with high income and high credit rating but high GDSR should be considered a higher risk to cause the lender pain, even though they may be considered "prime."<br /><br />It may or may not be true that Canadians borrowers are more creditworthy than their American counterparts. All this really tells us is that borrowers will generally hold more of the bag than the lenders. Can prices be speculative without leverage? I can think of a few scenarios where this is true...jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155122147972263497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-48901330732482802912010-05-03T09:16:13.755-07:002010-05-03T09:16:13.755-07:00Thanks to Mohican for the links. Grand Total of al...Thanks to Mohican for the links. Grand Total of all the pools $660b. Percentage teaser/total = 2.6%. Percentage of variable/total = 19%. Trouble?<br /><br />Seems to confirm the independent analysis from CAAMP...<br /><br />“CAAMP’s Fall 2009 survey of mortgage consumers found that VARIABLE/ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES ARE MOST COMMONLY USED BY PEOPLE RENEWING THEIR MORTGAGES. Their current interest rates are far below what they previously were able to afford, and EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A LARGE INCREASE IN THE RATES, THEIR MANDATORY PAYMENTS WOULD BE NO HIGHER THAN THEY PREVIOUSLY COULD AFFORD. Among those who had renewed an existing mortgage during the past year, 30% took a variable rate mortgage.<br /><br /> • Research for this report, using CAAMP’s extensive microfile, finds that in 2009, 86% of mortgages for home purchase had fixed rates. The share fell late in the year, as an increased differential between variable rates (typically 2.25%) and fixed rates (around 4.0%) encouraged more use of variable rate mortgages. Even so, the share for fixed rate mortgages remained very high. As is elaborated below, this shift towards variable rate mortgages has not resulted in increased risk...<br /><br />• It is not true that buyers who take adjustable or variable rate mortgages are borrowing to the limits of what they can currently afford. FOR INSURED MORTGAGES, FOR ADJUSTABLE RATE LOANS, LENDERS MUST “QUALIFY” THE BORROWERS (CALCULATE AFFORDABILITY) BASED ON RATES FOR THREE YEAR FIXED RATE MORTGAGES, NOT ON THE ACTUAL CONTRACT RATES. This inherently gives the borrowers considerable capacity to absorb future rises in rates. Furthermore, the vast majority of borrowers are borrowing less than they could afford to, even at<br />the higher qualifying interest rates. These points are illustrated below using data from the CAAMP database.”JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-8802398652368534192010-05-03T07:18:48.894-07:002010-05-03T07:18:48.894-07:00All of the information about the NHA MBS program y...All of the information about the NHA MBS program you can possibly stand is right here: <a rel="nofollow">http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/hoficlincl/mobase/index.cfm</a><br /><br />or <br /><br /><a rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/2fd5bsm</a>mohicanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06094213357140749289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-60687624327553166092010-05-03T03:21:57.563-07:002010-05-03T03:21:57.563-07:00"It matters not. Prices compared to rents are..."It matters not. Prices compared to rents are high and, subprime or no, that's ALL I need to know to call a bubble"<br /><br />So long as a large enough percentage is colateralized by debt, all that is needed after this is a credit cycle then poof we get to see the mechanics of non zero sum markets!<br /><br />RE: JimTan<br /><br />"am not saying that markets are efficient 100% of the time. Indeed, I pointed out that markets are often efficient only in the weak form"<br /><br />I can agree with that, sorry for the misunderstandingbuff_butlerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13312280863888753900noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-73708322817034255222010-05-03T02:59:50.236-07:002010-05-03T02:59:50.236-07:00"And was predicted, by a lot of very knowledg..."And was predicted, by a lot of very knowledgeable, independent voices, promptly ridiculed and marginalized by those intent on making personal fortunes off the bubble"<br /><br />anyone remember that interview with Ben Stien and Peter Schiff? Sigh... Very sad. Note the 4 on 1...<br /><br />http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UfC2gRG9uJgbuff_butlerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13312280863888753900noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-17825851119188965902010-05-02T21:45:14.061-07:002010-05-02T21:45:14.061-07:00The subprime mess caught a lot of economists and b...<i>The subprime mess caught a lot of economists and business media by surprise.</i><br /><br />Well, yeah! The ones being very well paid to come up with quasi-logical truthinesses as to why it wasn't a classic bubble.<br />Being paid by the same people working hard to change the regulation.<br /><i>Without regulations, much of that $2 trillion was predatory or outright fraudulent. </i><br />Right, those regulations, that were put in place to prevent such a problem, and then subverted, ignored and avoided.<br /><br />The whole thing was not an accident, was entirely predictable and avoidable. <br />And was predicted, by a lot of very knowledgeable, independent voices, promptly ridiculed and marginalized by those intent on making personal fortunes off the bubble, aided and abetted by well meaning but naive and trusting believers in the efficient market and the wisdom of the government. Bubbles in general feel just wonderful to everyone involved right up to the moment of popping. JimTan, have a very close look at this link: http://www.mirrors-r-us.com/alexcanuckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08605337369229736033noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-84540483881566787932010-05-02T21:30:29.094-07:002010-05-02T21:30:29.094-07:00“In the effort of being fact based here - in relat...“In the effort of being fact based here - in relation to ARM or teaser rate mortgages here in Canada. They do exist and CMHC insures them. Pool 987 in the NHA MBS program contains teaser rate type mortgages and there has been $17,376,495,464.82 underwritten in that pool 2005 to present ... Variable Rate Mortgages contained within the NHA MBS pools. 980 $20,674,972,955.82 985 $105,400,963,811.28”<br /><br />Thanks Mohican. That's interesting. Please provide links so that we can all check it out.<br /><br />Note that $17b (if that is all) is just a tiny fraction of the subprime origination in the States during 2004-6 (over US$2 trillion at exchange rate of @$1.20). Even adjusted per capita. <br /><br />What's the teaser-rate proportion of all Canadian mortgages?<br /><br />Look at the graph 'Fed Funds Rate & Mortgage Rates 2001 to 2008' in the wiki article on Subprime Mortgage Crisis.<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis<br /><br />Let me point out that simple variable rate mortgages worked out well for those who borrowed in 2006-7. One-year ARM rate was @5.5% in 2006-7. But, crashed in late 2008-9. Like the Canadian borrowers, those who still had jobs were in great shape because of better cash flow. Smart?<br /><br />Did variable rate mortgages contribute to the RE boom? I don't think so. <br /><br />One-year ARM dropped from 7% in 2001 to 4% in 2003. That's only a three percentage points drop. Quite moderate for a cycle top to bottom. By comparison, the Fed Funds rate dropped 5 percentage points. That benefited businesses borrowers substantially.<br /><br />By 2006, the one-year ARM was back up to 5.5%, less than a percentage point lower than 30-year fixed rate!!!<br /><br />Variable rates looked like they were priced correctly, and was not the critical factor in the RE 'bubble'.JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-75948803899021471252010-05-02T20:43:10.832-07:002010-05-02T20:43:10.832-07:00"they won't make the same mistake that Gr...<i>"they won't make the same mistake that Greenspan did. "</i><br /><br />And what mistake was that, just for clarification?jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155122147972263497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-58446012846878624652010-05-02T20:33:51.556-07:002010-05-02T20:33:51.556-07:00“All this happened! And the efficient market did t...“All this happened! And the efficient market did the thing it was supposed to do, took note of the fact that fraud and ponzi-style bubbles were now officially encouraged, and set itself up for wild swings and crashes...”<br /><br />Dear Alex,<br /><br />Don't think so. The subprime mess caught a lot of economists and business media by surprise. Their explanation? The size of the sector was hidden in aggregate totals. The security packaging was done OTC. The secondary market was OTC. This was a new market that was unreported, unmonitored and unregulated.<br /><br />By 2007, defaults were doubling (even before the recession). Some mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006/7 had a 50% default rate . Borrowers and investors were complaining. But, it was too late. WaMu and Countrywide were about to fail. Market insiders like Paulson were ready to bet against the securities. But, the government (Bush Administration) seemed to be the last to know.<br /><br />Look at the estimates of growth of subprime loans. It was small (5% of total mortgages) even in 2000. But, @$2 trillion was issued between 2004-2007. By 2004, subprime had suddenly jumped to 20% and quality of the loans was terrible. See the chart 'U.S. Home Ownership and Subprime Origination Share'<br /><br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis<br /><br />The problem was not that subprime loans existed. Anyone can do that in a free market. The problem was that subprime loans grew so quickly in the States. Without regulations, much of that $2 trillion was predatory or outright fraudulent. <br /><br />Dear Jesse,<br /><br />I am sure that they are working with data prepared by economists. I am also sure that this time, they won't make the same mistake that Greenspan did. They just had a wake up call.JimTanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13480972517925246528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-10525048291565191132010-05-02T16:21:40.307-07:002010-05-02T16:21:40.307-07:00Thanks for the discussion, all.
I will archive the...Thanks for the discussion, all.<br />I will archive the examples gathered by alexcanuck at VREAA.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-40774228202789606802010-05-02T13:43:13.317-07:002010-05-02T13:43:13.317-07:00Thanks mohican. Again, it's predominately the ...Thanks mohican. Again, it's predominately the pool of borrowers, not the lender, that determines the "primeness" of the revenue side of the pool (government guarantee aside), though certainly a higher rate will be more prone to defaults regardless of the credit-worthiness of buyers.<br /><br />I am aware of stated income loans being accepted through CMHC but -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- some form of reasonable documentation is required.<br /><br />It makes some financial sense for a lender to get a borrower, whether prime or below-prime, into as high an interest rate as possible. Teaser rates and other predatory schemes aren't exclusively flogged on the downtrodden. I disagree that such schemes be labeled as "subprime" until we really define what "subprime" means.jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155122147972263497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-52385024574852828442010-05-02T12:54:23.119-07:002010-05-02T12:54:23.119-07:00More facts.
Variable Rate Mortgages contained wit...More facts.<br /><br />Variable Rate Mortgages contained within the NHA MBS pools.<br /><br />980 $20,674,972,955.82<br />985 $105,400,963,811.28mohicanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06094213357140749289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-70039192729601868202010-05-02T12:50:07.607-07:002010-05-02T12:50:07.607-07:00In the effort of being fact based here - in relati...In the effort of being fact based here - in relation to ARM or teaser rate mortgages here in Canada. They do exist and CMHC insures them. Pool 987 in the NHA MBS program contains teaser rate type mortgages and there has been $17,376,495,464.82 underwritten in that pool 2005 to present.mohicanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06094213357140749289noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-29161204834916516002010-05-02T11:14:47.136-07:002010-05-02T11:14:47.136-07:00Subprime has more to do with the quality of the bo...Subprime has more to do with the quality of the borrower than the structure of the loan itself. That a bank is willing to give a low rate to a borrower due to CMHC-perpetuated moral hazard is just as much "sub prime" as some crazy teaser schedule in the US, assuming the borrower's credit rating is the same.<br /><br />I also think there was both more overbuilding and more true "subprime" lending in the US than we have seen in Canada. As much as CMHC has problems, you generally can't get a loan without some proof of income. That bar was raised last month. <br /><br />It matters not. Prices compared to rents are high and, subprime or no, that's ALL I need to know to call a bubble. <br /><br />It's well worth reading the Calculated Risk <a href="http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2010/05/fed-discussed-possible-housing-bubble.html" rel="nofollow">post</a> on the FOMC minutes from 2004. The national price-rent ratio was thrown in the faces of Greenspan, Bernanke, Geithner, etc. Not only did they "adjust" the data to make it look less "alarming," they actually believed that a lower price-rent ratio was justified because incomes were going to rise faster than they had for generations before. I don't need a PhD in economics to see what a fallacy that was.<br /><br />I wonder what data Mark Carney and his committees are looking at to formulate policy.jessehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02155122147972263497noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-57615189218749008242010-05-02T08:29:49.575-07:002010-05-02T08:29:49.575-07:00Let me clarify. The ARM that I am referring to are...<i>Let me clarify. The ARM that I am referring to are predatory lending practices. For example, teaser rates (sub-market rate) is charged for the first two years.</i><br /><br />You want predatory teaser rates?<br /><b>Free Mortgage Payments for Up to 2 Years at Marinus at Plaza 88 New Westminster"</b><br />http://tinyurl.com/ylca47u<br /><br />You want 0% down?<br /><b>Enjoy everything that life has to offer right now with a 0% down payment plan. Stop wasting your money on rent, and purchase a new Surrey ...! To get this zero down offer at Clayton Heights family homes, you can easily qualifty with a family income from as low as $49/hour today! Yes, that is 0% down for a fabulous new Surrey home! As for the zero down payment option, if you get a three year mortgage term, you monthly payments for a new Surrey family home is only $3300 per month. </b><br />http://tinyurl.com/y5rcra5<br /><br />You want a cash-back mortgage for a self-employed declared income sub-prime borrower?<br /><b>Our Canadian mortgage brokers specialize in self employed mortgages, no money down mortgages in Canada (5% cash back mortgages), sub-prime mortgages, private mortgages in Canada and debt consolidation mortgages all with expert advice and guidance you can only get from a licensed and fully trained Canadian mortgage broker. Our Canadian mortgage brokers negotiate with the banks on your behalf, getting you the best mortgage rates in Canada, best terms and mortgage products available, all at no cost to you!</b><br />http://tinyurl.com/386u6wb<br /><br />All those are current, advertised, locally available. I don't think the efficient market would allow such products to be available if there wasn't a demand for them.alexcanuckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08605337369229736033noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-72439920183554134412010-05-02T07:58:02.496-07:002010-05-02T07:58:02.496-07:00Respond a bit to JimTan:
Therefore, the reason tha...Respond a bit to JimTan:<br /><i>Therefore, the reason that the subprime crisis occurred was that critical information was not publicly available. The size, scope and nature of the new industry (subprime lending and repackaging as securities) was unreported, unsupervised and unregulated.<br /><br />Decision makers would have acted differently and no crisis would have occurred. The American RE markets would have undergone only the regular cyclical downturn.<br />Borrowers would not have signed ARM where the true interest rate was 13%. Lenders would not have financed fraudulent loans. Insurers would not have guaranteed the securities. Credit agencies would not have rated them AAA.<br /><br />Buyers would not have have bought the securities, Economists would have taken note of the risky enterprise. Regulators should have showed the red flag by 2005. Instead, they choose to blind the public and themselves.</i><br /><br /><br />All these things DID happen, did happen in the open, all players except the public DID know what was going on. The warning signs were glaring red for anyone in the public that cared to look. It's a lot bigger, sadder, more corrupt and more predictable than your little "efficient market" takes account for. Laws were changed, sometimes retroactively to accommodate it, rating agencies were co-opted, lenders advanced loans knowing full well that they made their money up front and passed the risk on. Insurers "guaranteed" without the backing to pay off if things actually went south. The FBI of all people warned of rampant fraud in 2004, and were ordered to ignore it! http://tinyurl.com/bczlxu<br /><br />All this happened! And the efficient market did the thing it was supposed to do, took note of the fact that fraud and ponzi-style bubbles were now officially encouraged, and set itself up for wild swings and crashes, all to the great detriment of anyone unwilling to play by the new rules.alexcanuckhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08605337369229736033noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31427364.post-36435182269025824512010-05-02T07:52:45.856-07:002010-05-02T07:52:45.856-07:00Told ya this guy actually believes his own BS.Told ya this guy actually believes his own BS.macho slobhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15640891497806482996noreply@blogger.com